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Language Disenfranchisement in Juries:  
A Call for Constitutional Remediation 
Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose* 
Approximately thirteen million U.S. citizens, mostly Latinos and other people of color, 
are denied the right to serve on juries due to English language requirements and despite 
the possibility (and centuries-old tradition) of juror language accommodation. This 
exclusion results in the underrepresentation of racial minorities on juries and has a 
detrimental impact on criminal defendants, the perceived legitimacy of the justice system, 
and citizen participation in democracy. Yet, it has been virtually ignored. This Article 
examines the constitutionality of juror language requirements, focusing primarily on 
equal protection and the fair cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. Finding 
the existing juridical framework to be wanting, this Article introduces Critical 
Originalism—a melding of antisubordination deconstruction principles of Critical Race 
Theory with the interpretive methodology of Originalism Theory—as a new method of 
ascertaining and capturing the discriminatory intent behind a statute or procedural rule.  
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The racial composition of juries has caught the nation’s attention for 
decades. African Americans and Latinos continue to be overrepresented 
as criminal defendants but underrepresented as jurors.1 This is cause for 
serious concern because majority-white juries generally spend less time 
deliberating, consider fewer diverse perspectives, commit more errors, and 
exhibit more racism than racially diverse juries, which deliberate more 
thoroughly, commit fewer errors, diminish the expression of racism, and 
consider more varied perspectives.2 Legal scholars have evaluated the ways 
in which the law systematically restricts people of color from participating 
 
 1. Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross-Section 
Guarantee by Confusing It with Equal Protection, 64 Hastings L.J. 141, 145 n.16 (2012). 
 2.  See Edie Greene et al.,Wrightsman’s Psychology and the Legal System 305 (6th ed. 
2007); Bruce Evan Blaine, Understanding the Psychology of Diversity 101–04 (2d ed. 2013) 
(summarizing racial bias in jury deliberations and verdicts when juries are not sufficiently diverse); 
Neil Vidmar, The North Carolina Racial Justice Act: An Essay on Substantive and Procedural Fairness 
in Death Penalty Litigation, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1969, 1980 (2012).  
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on juries, and felon disenfranchisement has been at the forefront of this 
scholarly and public discourse.3 A prior felony conviction can strip a citizen 
of her right to serve on a jury, and this exclusion falls disproportionately 
on people of color. Similarly, disenfranchisement on the basis of language 
proficiency excludes roughly the same number of citizens4 but with two 
differences. First, language disenfranchisement creates even greater racial 
disproportionality than prior felony status. Second, the exclusion of citizens 
from jury service on the basis of English language ability has been virtually 
ignored. This presents multiple questions: Why is juror disenfranchisement 
on the basis of language not on the political and legal radar screens? 
Why are the racial implications of English language juror requirements 
overlooked? How can the Constitution be employed to redress juror 
language exclusion? This Article seeks to address these queries. 
The lack of attentiveness to juror language disenfranchisement as a 
political and legal issue is largely due to an assumption that a person 
must speak English to be able to effectively participate on a jury5 and the 
formalistic separation of language discrimination from race (as well as 
ethnicity and national origin) discrimination under the law. The 
assumption that English is necessary ignores the possibility of juror 
language accommodation. Allowing English language deficient jurors to 
serve with the assistance of interpreters has a rich centuries-long history 
in the Anglo-American and United States legal systems.6 For example, in 
the New Mexico state courts, juror language accommodation programs 
have been successfully employed for more than a century.7 In fact, in 
New Mexico, the exclusion of limited English proficient (“LEP”) citizens 
from jury service on the basis of their language ability violates the state 
constitution.8 Juror language accommodation also finds implicit support 
 
 3. See, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 65 (2003). 
 4. Statistics about the number of limited English proficient (“LEP”) U.S. citizens are not readily 
available. A reasonable estimate of the number of LEP citizens in the United States would be 
12.8 million. Approximately forty million people in the United States were foreign born in 2010. 
Elizabeth M. Grieco et al., U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey Report: The 
Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2010 at 1–2 (2012). Of that number, two-fifths (or 
17.48 million) are naturalized citizens. Id. at 2. Nearly thirty-nine percent of naturalized citizens are 
LEP. Migration Policy Inst., The United States: Language & Education, MPI Data Hub: Migration 
Facts, Stats, and Maps, http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/state2.cfm?ID=US#1. Thus, 
approximately 6.8 million naturalized citizens are LEP. Additionally, 1.9% of natural born citizens are 
LEP. Applied to the current population that is approximately six million natural born citizens. 
Therefore, in total approximately 12.8 million U.S. citizens are LEP. Similarly, thirteen million citizens 
are banned from jury service because they are felons. Kalt, supra note 3, at 67. 
 5. See Farida Ali, Multilingual Prospective Jurors: Assessing California Standards Twenty Years 
After Hernandez v. New York, 8 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 236, 245 n.65 (2013). 
 6. See Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De 
Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 777, 790 (1994). 
 7. Edward L. Chávez, New Mexico’s Success with Non-English Speaking Jurors, 1 J. Ct. 
Innovation 303, 303 (2008). 
 8. N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3; State v. Samora, 307 P.3d 328, 330–31 (N.M. 2013). 
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in federal courts and state jurisdictions that provide sign language 
interpreters for deaf and hard of hearing jurors.9 
There also appears to be a prevalent presumption by the courts that 
language discrimination is for the most part separable from race 
discrimination.10 Courts and scholars alike generally consider juror 
language restrictions to be color-blind and nondiscriminatory measures, 
and they ignore the reality that language is closely connected to (and in 
many instances inseparable from) race, ethnicity, and national origin.11 
Thus, although the exclusion of individuals from jury service on the basis 
of their race, ethnicity, or national origin is impermissible,12 the exclusion 
of LEP jurors on the basis of their English language ability is permissible 
despite the fact that it often has the same effect of excluding racial 
minorities from the jury pool. These racial implications are extensive and 
have been under-explored. 
In the United States, approximately nine percent of the population is 
LEP.13 There is a tremendous relationship between race and limited 
English proficiency. Approximately forty-four percent of Latinos and 
forty percent of Asian Americans are LEP.14 In total, about eighty-seven 
percent of LEP people in the United States are people of color.15 Based 
on current population estimates, these percentages translate into an 
estimated 25.67 million people of color, approximately 21 million of 
whom are Latino. It is not known precisely how many LEP persons are 
U.S. citizens and thus eligible to serve on a jury. Under a conservative 
estimate, 11.3 million of the 13 million LEP U.S. citizens are people of 
color, and the vast majority are Latino.16 What is undeniable, but rarely 
discussed, is that the exclusion of LEP persons from the jury box is 
overwhelmingly the exclusion of people of color, particularly Latinos. 
 
 9. See Colin A. Kisor, Using Interpreters to Assist Jurors: A Plea for Consistency, 22 Chicano-
Latino L. Rev. 37, 50 (2001); see, e.g., United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084, 1091 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that the presence of a sign-language interpreter did not inhibit jury deliberations or constitute 
grounds for a new trial). 
 10. See Juan F. Perea, Buscando América: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect 
Latinos, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1431 (2004). 
 11. See id. at 1427. This Article uses the terms “blacks” and “African Americans” 
interchangeably except where black is used as an adjective, such as in reference to black Puerto 
Ricans. At points, the Article compares the black/African American experience and legal treatment 
with that of Latinos. However, it is important to note that the two groups are not clearly separable, as 
there is a sizable population of black Latinos in the United States.  
 12. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986). 
 13. Nat’l Ctr. on Immigr. Integration Pol’y, Data Brief: Limited English Proficient 
Individuals in the United States: Number, Share, Growth, and Linguistic Diversity 1 (2011). 
 14. Pew Hispanic Ctr., Table 20: Language Spoken at Home & English-Speaking Ability, by 
Age, Race and Ethnicity: 2009 (2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/ 
hispanics2009/Table%2020.pdf. 
 15. Id.  
 16. See Jorge M. Chavez et al., Sufren Los Niños: Exploring the Impact of Unauthorized 
Immigration Status on Children’s Well-Being, 50 Fam. Ct. Rev. 638, 638 (2012).  
Gonzales Rose_22 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete) 3/12/2014 4:19 PM 
April 2014]     LANGUAGE DISENFRANCHISEMENT 815 
Although the widespread requirement that jurors speak English 
affects many different racial groups, the burden of language exclusion is 
borne predominantly by Spanish-speaking Latinos. This is not surprising 
because Latinos are both the largest racial minority group17 and the 
largest linguistic minority population in the United States.18 It is also not 
surprising because English language restrictions have often arisen in 
response to perceived “threats” or “problems” concerning Latino 
immigration or presence.19 English language requirements and policies 
initially intended to primarily target Latinos and Spanish language 
users,20 but the resultant law or rule is stated in race-neutral terms. Under 
current constitutional analysis, the discriminatory intent, history, and 
context behind a language law, as well as its discriminatory effect, are 
generally ignored or disregarded. 
This Article examines the constitutionality of juror language 
prerequisites, with a focus on their impact on the Latino population. Part I 
provides an overview of the differing federal and state juror language 
proficiency requirements, as well as background information on the 
prevalence of LEP persons in the United States. Part II discusses the 
problems that juror language requirements pose. Part III examines juror 
English language restrictions under equal protection doctrines of the 
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments and the fair cross section requirement 
of the Sixth Amendment. This examination reveals shortcomings in the 
current constitutional jurisprudence, particularly equal protection law, 
which too often fails to recognize the racially discriminatory intent 
behind English language requirements. In response to this failing, this 
Article proposes Critical Originalism as a new method for ascertaining the 
discriminatory intent of a statute or procedural rule. Part IV proposes 
juror language accommodation as a viable solution for remedying the 
problems posed by the language requirements. 
I.  Juror Language Requirements and Limited English 
Proficiency in the United States 
A. Juror Language Requirements 
All federal courts and most state courts currently exclude LEP 
persons from jury service. However, despite the pervasiveness of juror 
language requirements, the severity of such restrictions varies greatly by 
 
 17. See id. 
 18. Ana Roca & John M. Lipski, Spanish in the United States: Linguistic Contact and 
Diversity 2 (1999). 
 19. See discussion infra Part I.A.2; Philip C. Aka & Lucinda M. Deason, Culturally Competent 
Public Services and English-Only Laws, 53 How. L.J. 53, 85 n.207 (2009). 
 20. See Steven W. Bender, Introduction: Old Hate in New Bottles: Privatizing, Localizing, and 
Bundling Anti-Spanish and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the 21st Century, 7 Nev. L.J. 883, 886 (2007). 
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jurisdiction. Some courts merely require that potential jurors understand 
or speak English, while others require that potential jurors are able to 
read and write in English. A survey of the various language prerequisites 
is important because the more stringent the language requirement, the 
greater the exclusion. 
1. The Federal English Language Juror Requirement 
The United States does not have an official language. Federal 
“Official English” legislation has been proposed repeatedly but has 
never survived a congressional vote.21 Nonetheless, English is the 
language used in all official proceedings of the federal courts, even in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, where the dominant 
language is Spanish.22 
The federal government mandated specific language requirements 
for jury service in the federal courts with The Jury Selection and Service 
Act of 1968 (“JSSA”).23 The JSSA was enacted to provide a uniform jury 
selection process to ensure that jury pools are drawn from a “fair cross 
section of the community” so that “[n]o citizen shall be excluded from 
service as a grand or petit juror . . . on account of race, color, religion, 
sex, national origin, or economic status.”24 In terms of a prospective 
juror’s language abilities, the JSSA provides that a person is not qualified 
for jury service in any federal court if he or she does not speak English or 
“is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a 
degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror 
qualification form.”25 This is a rather stringent standard which would 
exclude anyone who speaks English less than very well or who lacks 
written literacy in English. 
Although the purpose behind the JSSA is to ensure that a jury is 
representative of the community, when employed in communities with 
high numbers of language minorities, the JSSA’s English language 
prerequisite actually prevents significant numbers of racial and national 
origin minorities from serving. In our current national demographic, 
where Latinos represent the largest and most rapidly growing minority 
group, language restrictions such as those in the JSSA can prevent the 
 
 21. See English Language Unity Act of 2011, H.R. 997, 112th Cong. (2011) (“To declare English 
as the official language of the United States.”); English Language Unity Act of 2009, H.R. 997, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (“To declare English as the official language of the United States[.]”); National 
Language Act of 2009, H.R. 1229, 111th Cong. (2009) (“[T]o declare English as the official language of 
the Government of the United States.”); H.R.J. Res. 19, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 963–64 (D.P.R. 1968). 
 23. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968). 
 24. Id. § 1862. 
 25. Id. § 1865(b)(1)–(3). 
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jury pool from being derived from a fair cross section of the community.26 
As discussed below, the majority of states have similar English language 
requirements that also result in exclusionary outcomes. 
2. State English Language Juror Requirements 
In the state courts, English language juror requirements are derived 
from several different sources, including “official English” or “English-
only” laws, juror language proficiency laws, and local jury rules. Indirect 
sources, such as “English-only” or “official English” laws, while not 
always binding, set an influential tone in considering who can participate 
in governmental functions like jury service. There are twenty-six states 
that currently have “official English” or “English-only” laws.27 The bulk 
of these laws are statutes, but others came about as amendments to state 
constitutions.28 “Official English” laws are decrees declaring English as 
the official language of the state and government.29 “English-only” laws 
 
 26. See generally Andrea Freeman, Linguistic Colonialism: Law, Independence, and Language 
Rights in Puerto Rico, 20 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 179, 190–92 (2010). 
 27. Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.01; Alaska Stat. § 44.12.300 (2011); Ariz. Const. art. XXVIII, § 4; 
H.C. Res. 2036, 47th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006); Ark. Code Ann. § 1-4-117 (2011); Cal. Const. 
art. III, § 6; Colo. Const. art. II, § 30a; Fla. Const. art. II, § 9; Ga. Code Ann. § 50-3-100 (2011); 
Idaho Code Ann. § 73-121 (2012); 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 460/20 (2011); Ind. Code. § 1-2-10-1 (2011); 
Iowa Code § 1.18 (2012); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 73-2801 (2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2.013 (West 2011); 
Miss. Code. Ann. § 3-3-31 (2011); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.028 (2011); Neb. Const. art. I, § 27; N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 3-C:1 (2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 145-12 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 54-02-13 (2011); S.C. 
Code Ann. § 1-1-696 (2012); S.D. Codified Laws § 1-27-20 (2012); Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-404 (2012); 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-1-201 (West 2011); Va. Code Ann. § 1-511 (2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-6-101 
(2011). Additionally Hawai’i provides that English and Hawaiian are the official languages of Hawai’i, 
Haw. Const. art. XV, § 4. 
 28.  The English language laws in Alabama, Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.01, California, Cal. Const. 
art. III, § 6, Colorado, Colo. Const. art. II, § 30, Florida, Fla. Const. art. II, § 9, and Nebraska, Neb. 
Const. art. I, § 27, are all constitutional amendments. Arizona has both a constitutional amendment 
and a statute. Ariz. Const. art. XXVIII, § 4; H.C. Res. 2036, 47th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006). In 
distinguishing constitutional amendments from statutory enactments, Hans Linde notes that 
“constitutions [and subsequent amendments] define structures, processes, and restraints of 
government, while rules directed at the governed are laws and cannot properly be initiated as 
amendments to the constitution.” Hans A. Linde, What Is A Constitution, What Is Not, and Why Does 
It Matter?, 87 Or. L. Rev. 717, 727 (2008). Thus, in the context of language rights, “English-Only” 
amendments are a mandate on the state legislature to ensure that English remains the official language 
of the state. Conversely, the legislature can more easily change statutory provisions. 
 29. See, e.g., Iowa Code, § 1.18(3) (“In order to encourage every citizen of this state to become 
more proficient in the English language, thereby facilitating participation in the economic, political, 
and cultural activities of this state and of the United States, the English language is hereby declared to 
be the official language of the state of Iowa.”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.028 (“The general assembly 
recognizes that English is the common language used in Missouri and recognizes that fluency in 
English is necessary for full integration into our common American culture for reading readiness.”); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-510 (2011) (“(1) English is the official and primary language of: (a) the state 
and local governments; (b) government officers and employees acting in the course and scope of their 
employment; and (c) government documents and records.”). Nevertheless, scholar Juan Perea argues 
that the “anti-Hispanic origins of the official English movement provide ample evidence that, under 
present circumstances, proposals for official English legislation in fact represent discrimination against 
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often go further than just requiring that English be deemed the “official 
language” of the state and additionally require that some or all 
governmental activities be conducted in English. For example, Article 28 
of the Arizona Constitution has been amended to state that “[o]fficial 
actions shall be conducted in English.”30 Nevertheless, despite the 
movement toward “English-only” laws, the state and federal 
constitutionality of these laws is highly suspect and, in multiple instances, 
has been successfully challenged.31 
In addition to questions about their constitutionality, official English 
laws have been criticized for being nativist, racist, and xenophobic.32 
Often the popular movements that prompt legislative action are 
undeniably racist and anti-Latino.33 These actions are motivated by a 
“fear of a Hispanic takeover” and “questions about the intelligence and 
values of Latin American immigrants,” and are pursued to further 
“missions of ‘race betterment.’”34 Although English-only or official 
English laws might not directly prevent the participation of LEP 
individuals in jury service, the laws set an unmistakable tone of language 
intolerance and demonstrate a desire to exclude language minorities 
from full participation in state activities. 
Additionally, forty-one states have juror statutes which require that 
prospective jurors possess some level of English language proficiency in 
order to serve on a jury panel.35 These requirements vary in their 
 
Hispanics, in principal part, framed by proxy and indirection through the closely correlated medium of 
language.” Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural 
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 269, 360 (1992). 
 30. Ariz. Const. art. XXVIII, § 4. 
 31. In Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the 
Official English Initiative, which adopted English as the state’s official language, was unconstitutional 
on First Amendment grounds. 170 P.3d 183 (Alaska 2007). The Court explained “that a wholesale 
prohibition on speech in languages other than English by all state and local government employees 
creates an untenable risk of preventing employees from speaking freely on matters of public concern. 
To the extent that the OEI bars elected officials and public employees from helping citizens secure 
available services and participate fully in civic life, it touches upon matters of public concern.” Id. at 
204 (footnote ommitted). 
 32. Perea, supra note 29, at 356–57. 
 33. See generally Lupe S. Salinas, Immigration and Language Rights: The Evolution of Private 
Racist Attitudes into American Public Law and Policy, 7 Nev. L.J. 895 (2007). 
 34. Aka & Deason, supra note 19, at 85 n.207 (citing Thomas Ricento’s research “based on 
examination of the internal documents, funding sources and written statements of leaders of the 
English-Only movement”). 
 35. Ala. Code § 12-16-59 (2011); Alaska Stat. § 09.20.010 (2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-
202 (2012); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-102 (2011); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 203 (West 2012); Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 13-71-105 (2012); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-217 (2011); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4509 (2011); Ga. 
Code Ann. § 15-12-163 (2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 612-4 (2011); Idaho Code Ann. § 2-209 (2012); 
705 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 305/2 (2011); Ind. Code § 33-28-5-18 (2013), Ind. St. Jury R. 5 (2011); Iowa 
Code § 607A.4 (2012); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 43-158 (2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29A.080 (West 2011); 
La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 401 (2011); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 1211 (2011); Md. Cts. & Jud. 
Proc. Code Ann. § 8-103 (West 2011); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 234A, § 4 (2011); Mich. Comp. Laws 
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stringency and expectations of English proficiency and language skill sets. 
The variance in English language requirements is significant because 
English language abilities differ greatly among persons for whom English 
is not a first language. The first foreign language skill learned is generally 
comprehension, followed by speaking ability, reading, and lastly, writing.36 
Many people who speak English as a second language are unable to read 
or write in English, or are very limited in their ability.37 This is not 
surprising because a large percentage of English as a second language 
(“ESL”) learners are fairly uneducated.38 If the individual is illiterate in her 
native language, it is not likely that she will become literate in English.39 
Furthermore, illiteracy remains a problem for a considerable number of 
native English speakers as well, particularly for persons of color.40 Thus, 
even native English speakers could be excluded in jurisdictions that 
predicate jury service on the ability to read and write, a situation that 
further limits the number of racial minorities eligible for jury service. 
On the most restrictive end of the spectrum of state juror language 
prerequisites are those in place in Louisiana, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, and Vermont, which demand that jurors read, write, speak, and 
understand English.41 These statutes arguably go beyond the federal 
requirement because they do not limit the required level of language 
proficiency to that which is necessary to complete a juror qualification 
form.42 Similarly, although the South Dakota juror eligibility statute does 
not articulate any requirement to speak English, it requires that jurors be 
able to read, write, and understand English without qualification of the 
proficiency level.43 Maryland roughly follows the federal requirement—
 
§ 600.1307a (2012); Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 808 (2011); Miss. Code. Ann. § 13-5-1 (2011); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 494.425 (2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1601 (2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 6.010 (2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 500-A:7-a (2011); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2B:20-1 (West 2011); N.Y. Jud. Law § 510 (McKinney 
2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9-3 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-09.1-07 (2011); Ohio Crim. R. 24 (2011); 
Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 658 (2011); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4502 (2011); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-9-1.1 (2011); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-810 (2012); S.D. Codified Laws § 16-13-10 (2012); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-
105 (West 2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 962 (2012); Wash. Rev. Code § 2.36.070 (2012); W. Va. Code 
§ 52-1-8 (2012); Wis. Stat. § 756.02 (2012); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-101 (2011). 
 36. Pew Hispanic Ctr., Between Two Worlds: How Young Latinos Come of Age in America 
32 (2009). 
 37. Nat’l Ctr. on Immigrant Integration Policy, Migration Policy Inst., Taking Limited 
English Proficient Adults into Account in the Federal Adult Education Funding Formula 7 
(2009). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. National Assessment of Adult Literacy, Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, 
http://nces.ed.gov/naal/kf_dem_race.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). The statistics reveal that in reading 
“prose” whites had the highest scores, followed by Asians/Pacific Islanders, blacks, and finally 
Hispanics. 
 41. See La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 401 (2011); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4502 (2011); S.D. 
Codified Laws § 16-13-10 (2012); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 962 (2012). 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1)–(3) (2013). 
 43. S.D. Codified Laws § 16-13-10. 
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disqualifying individuals for jury service if they cannot speak, read, write, 
or comprehend English proficiently enough to satisfactorily complete a 
juror qualification form.44 
A dozen states—Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Hawai’i, Idaho, 
Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Utah, and West 
Virginia—require jurors to be able to speak, understand, and read 
English.45 New Jersey requires that jurors understand and read English.46 
With less stringency, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and Washington require that jurors 
speak and understand or communicate in English. Alaska requires that 
jurors read or speak English.47 More flexibly, Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin command 
that the juror understands English.48 Less clear are states like California, 
Kentucky, Nevada, and Wyoming, which require “sufficient” or 
“competent” knowledge of English without indicating precisely which 
language skill sets would satisfy the requirement.49 The juror qualification 
statutes for the remaining states—Montana, Florida, Tennessee, Texas, 
and Virginia—are silent on English proficiency.50 In stark contrast, the 
Constitution of New Mexico guarantees the right of any citizen to serve 
on a jury irrespective of their native language or inability to speak, read 
or write English or Spanish.51 
 
 44. “Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and subject to the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act, an individual is not qualified for jury service if the individual: (1) Cannot comprehend 
spoken English or speak English; (2) Cannot comprehend written English, read English, or write 
English proficiently enough to complete a juror qualification form satisfactorily.” Md. Cts. & Jud. 
Proc. Code Ann. § 8-103 (2011). 
 45. Ala. Code § 12-16-59 (2011); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-71-105 (2012); Del. Code tit. 10, § 4509 
(2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 612-4 (2011); Idaho Code § 209 (2012); Ind. Code § 33-28-5-18 (2013); Me. 
Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 1211 (2011); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 494.425 (2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1601 (2011); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 500-A:7-a (2011); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-105 (West 2011); W. Va. Code 
§ 52-1-8 (2012). 
 46. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2B:20-1 (West 2011). 
 47. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-102 (2011); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-217 (2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-
12-163 (2011); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 234A, § 4 (2011); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.1307a (2012); 
Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 808 (2011); N.Y. Jud. Law § 510 (McKinney 2011); Wash. Rev. Code § 2.36.070 
(2012). 
 48. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-202 (2012); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 305/2 (2011); Iowa Code Ann. 
§ 607A.4 (2012); Kan. Stat. § 43-158 (2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 9-3 (2011); Ohio Crim. R. 24 (2011): 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-9-1.1 (2011); Wis. Stat. § 756.02 (2012). 
 49. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 203 (West 2012); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29A.080 (2011); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 6.010 (2010); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 658 (2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-101 (2011). 
 50. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-202 (2012); Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-510 (2011); Fla. Const. art. II, § 9; 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-404 (2012); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 62.102 (West 2011); Va. Code Ann. 
§ 8.01-337 (2011). 
 51. See N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3; see also New Mexico v. Samora, 307 P.3d 328, 331 (N.M. 2013) 
(holding that dismissing a prospective juror for difficulty speaking English was a violation of the New 
Mexico Constitution). 
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The fact that the vast majority of states have English language 
prerequisites for jury service does not indicate the full breadth of the 
English language juror requirements in state courts. Even states that do 
not officially proclaim an English language requirement might be in the 
process of attempting to institute such a requirement, or employ such 
requirements in practice. For instance, Texas’s juror qualification statute 
states that a person is competent to serve as a juror if that person “is able 
to read and write,” but does not specify that the literacy must be in 
English.52 In April 2011, the Texas House of Representatives voted to 
make a person’s ability to read and write in English a qualification for 
service as a juror.53 In the Texas House debate, proponents of the bill 
stated that specifying that the requisite literacy be in English did not 
change existing practice in the Texas courts that already assumed the 
ability to read and write would be in English and not another language.54 
The Texas example demonstrates how juror language requirements can 
be stricter in practice than in print, thus excluding more potential jurors 
than the statute might suggest on its face. 
Juror language requirements that are stricter in practice than the 
statute requires are manifest in materials published on court websites or 
in printed pamphlet forms for prospective jurors. For instance, the 
Indiana state court jury rules provide that in order to serve as a juror, a 
potential juror must affirm that she is able to understand, read, and 
speak English.55 However, the prospective jurors’ “frequently asked 
questions” section of the Indianapolis and Marion County court’s website 
assert that in addition to understanding, speaking, and reading English, a 
person must also be able to write in English to qualify for jury service.56 
Similarly, the Arkansas statute provides that a prospective juror must 
only speak or understand English, while the lay materials on the state 
court website include a requirement that a juror be able to read and 
write English.57 
In several other jurisdictions, lay materials serve to clarify and 
strengthen an ambiguous juror requirement. In California and Wyoming, a 
person is competent to serve as a juror if she has “sufficient knowledge” of 
 
 52. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 62.102. 
 53. H.B. 1633, 82d Leg. (Tex. 2011) (relating to a person’s ability to read and write English as a 
qualification for service as a petit juror). 
 54. House Transcript Apr. 19, 2011, Tex Tribune (Apr. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.texastribune.org/session/82R/transcripts/2011/4/19/house. 
 55. Ind. Code § 33-28-5-18 (2013). 
 56. Frequently Asked Questions, City of Indianapolis & Marion Cnty., http://www.indy.gov/ 
eGov/Courts/JuryPool/Pages/faqs.aspx#1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
 57. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-102 (2011); Who May be Called to Serve as a Juror?, Ark. Judiciary, 
https://courts.arkansas.gov/content/who-may-be-called-serve-juror (last visited Feb. 2, 2014) (“You 
may be summoned for jury duty if you . . . have the ability to read and write in English.”). 
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the English language—an inherently ambiguous and flexible standard.58 
However, court websites for prospective jurors state that a prospective 
juror must understand, speak, read, and write English in order to serve.59 
Irrespective of whether the website materials are the policy of the court, 
such representations undoubtedly discourage participation by prospective 
jurors who might be qualified under the law to serve, but who might 
underestimate their language abilities or be dissuaded from participating 
on a jury due to fears of prejudice. Therefore, at a minimum, the websites 
might cause prospective jurors who are self-conscious about their limited 
English language abilities to question their language skills, be deterred 
from following through with jury service, and possibly opt for self-
removal from the jury pool.60 
In addition to actual juror language requirements, inconsistencies in 
courtroom practices and inaccurate lay materials present significant risk 
of excluding qualified jurors from the jury pool. Although the right to 
serve on a jury is an essential right of citizenship, it appears that these 
unauthorized and even unlawful restrictions and deterrents generally go 
unnoticed and unchallenged. This is indicative of social and legal cultures 
that have become desensitized to, and unmindful of, language 
discrimination even where key citizenship rights are breached. 
B. Limited English Proficiency in the United States 
In the United States, approximately twenty percent of individuals 
aged five or older speak a language other than English at home.61 Census 
data shows that, in 2005 and 2009, approximately 9.4%62 of the population 
was LEP.63 Research also indicates that the percentage of LEP individuals 
is actually on the rise—over 29.5 million people in the United States are 
 
 58. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 203 (West 2012); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-101 (2011). 
 59. Jury Service Basics, Judicial Council of Cal., http://www.courts.ca.gov/jurybasics.htm (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2014); Jury Duty, Crook Cnty. Wyo., http://www.crookcounty.wy.gov/elected_officials/ 
clerk_of_district_court/jury_duty.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
 60. See Hiroshi Fukurai, Critical Evaluations of Hispanic Participation on the Grand Jury: Key-Man 
Selection, Jurymandering, Language, and Representative Quotas, 5 Tex. Hisp. J. L. & Pol’y 7, 8, 34 (2001). 
 61. Hyon B. Shin & Robert A. Kominski, U.S. Census Bureau, Language Use in the United 
States: 2007 at 2 (2010). 
 62. In 2005, 9.46% of the total population was LEP, and 85.98% of LEP individuals were people of 
color. Pew Hispanic Ctr., Table 17: English Ability by Age, Race and Ethnicity: 2005, available at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2006/09/19/a-statistical-portrait-20. In 2009, 9.41% of the total population 
was LEP, and eighty-seven percent of LEP individuals were people of color. Pew Hispanic Ctr., supra 
note 14. 
 63. In collecting and analyzing language data, the Census Bureau does not define Limited English 
Proficiency. Rather, the individual interviewed is asked to characterize their ability to speak English 
as: “very well,” “well,” “not well,” or “not at all.” See Shin & Kominski, supra note 61, at 1. For the 
purposes of this paper, limited English proficiency is defined as speaking English less than “very well.” 
As jury service requires a high level of language comprehension, it is likely that a person who speaks 
English less than very well would be unable to serve without the assistance of an interpreter. 
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LEP—making it likely that the percentage of LEP individuals in the 
population will continue to increase or at a minimum remain constant.64 
Data shows that there is a significant relationship between English 
language ability and race. In 2009, eighty-seven percent of the LEP 
population was comprised of people of color.65 As applied to the current 
population, that is 25.67 million people of color.66 Furthermore, 
approximately forty-four percent of Latinos and forty percent of Asians 
are LEP.67 In particular, more than seventy-five percent of Latino 
immigrants in the United States cannot speak English “very well.”68 Only 
seven percent of Latino immigrants speak English primarily or exclusively 
at home.69 Further, the rate of limited English proficiency drops based on 
educational level.70 Sixty-two percent of Latino immigrants with college 
degrees report being able to speak English very well.71 That percentage 
plummets to only thirty-four percent for Latino immigrants with just a 
high school education and eleven percent for those who never completed 
high school.72 Spanish speakers make up approximately 62.3% of 
Americans that speak a language other than English at home.73 
LEP Spanish speakers are heavily concentrated in the Southwest,74 
Texas,75 California,76 and Florida.77 Moreover, in many communities in the 
United States, LEP Latinos comprise a large percentage of the population. 
In border communities such as San Luis, Arizona, for example, 87.6% of 
residents speak Spanish at home,78 and 62% of these individuals speak 
English less than very well.79 In Nogales, Arizona, 90.8% of residents 
 
 64. Nat’l Ctr. on Immigrant Integration Policy, supra note 37, at 1. 
 65. Pew Hispanic Ctr., supra note 14. 
 66. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated the total U.S. population was 315,624,388 in April 2013. 
 67. Pew Hispanic Ctr., supra note 14. 
 68. Shirin Hakimzadeh & D’Vera Cohn, Pew Hispanic Ctr., English Usage Among Hispanics 
in the United States 1 (2007). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See generally U.S. Census Bureau, Detailed Tables, in 2006–2008 American Community 
Survey (2011) available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/language/data/other/detailed-lang-
tables.xls. In Arizona, 21.69% of the population speaks Spanish. Id. at tbl.5. In New Mexico, 28.31% of 
the population speaks Spanish. Id. at tbl.34. 
 75. Id. at tbl.46 (reporting that 28.98% of the population in Texas speaks Spanish). 
 76. Id. at tbl.6 (reporting 28.24% of the population in California speaks Spanish). 
 77. Id. at tbl.11 (reporting 18.81% of the population in Florida speaks Spanish). 
 78. U.S. Census Bureau, 2005–2009 Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, at B16001 (2009), 
available at http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t (insert 
“B16001: Language Spoken at Home by Ability to Speak English for the Population 5-Years and 
Over,” then search “San Luis city, Arizona” and “Nogales city, Arizona,” and follow hyperlink 
associated with Dataset “2009 ACS 5-year estimates”).  
 79. Id. 
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speak Spanish at home80 and, of that population, 53.7% speak English 
less than very well.81 In Hialeah, Florida, 93.6% of residents speak 
Spanish at home,82 and 65% speak English less than very well.83 
Furthermore, the 2010 U.S. Census reports that not only are Latinos 
the largest minority group, but in the past decade, the rate of growth of 
the Latino population has been greater than any other racial or ethnic 
group;84 the Latino population increased by forty-three percent, 
approximately four times the nation’s growth rate.85 Therefore, assuming 
that immigration rates will remain steady, it is likely that the number of 
LEP Spanish speakers in the United States will continue to increase, 
making the juror language exclusion issue increasingly more important, 
particularly for Latinos.  
II.  The Problems with Juror Language Requirements 
As the vast majority of LEP individuals are racial minorities, the 
exclusion of persons from jury service on the basis of English language 
ability often results in the removal of people of color from the jury pool. 
In areas with heavy LEP citizen populations, such as the Spanish-
speaking Latino communities mentioned above, language requirements 
can produce juries that are not representative of the community. This has 
considerable detrimental effects on criminal defendants, potential jurors, 
and the perceived legitimacy and actual integrity of our legal system. 
A. Criminal Defendants 
Criminal defendants, especially racial minority defendants, are the 
population most directly affected by juries that are not diverse or 
representative of the community. The U.S. criminal justice system has a 
long history of disproportionately prosecuting and incarcerating people 
of color.86 Thus, the integrity of the criminal justice system is arguably most 
important to criminal defendants, whose lives and liberties are in the hands 
of criminal juries. Due to the disproportionate prosecution of people of 
color, the racial composition of the jury pool is a crucial factor in ensuring 
that a defendant receives a fair and just trial. There are many factors that 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (insert “B16001: Language Spoken at Home by Ability to Speak English for the 
Population 5-Years and Over,” then search “Hialeah city, Florida,” and follow hyperlink for table). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Sharon R. Ennis et al., U.S. Census Bureau, The Hispanic Population: 2010 at 2 
(May 2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness 16 (2010). 
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contribute to racial imbalance in juries, but English language requirements 
and their effects on Latino jury service have gone relatively unnoticed. 
Like African Americans, Latinos are highly overrepresented in the 
criminal justice system,87 but unlike African Americans, criminal justice 
statistics regarding Latinos in the criminal justice system are lacking. 
Latinos are often lumped together with whites in government statistics, 
thereby masking the racial divide in the criminal justice system and 
prisons.88 Even so, available statistics indicate a clear overrepresentation 
of Latinos in the criminal justice system. For instance, “[i]n 2007, four-in-
ten (40%) offenders sentenced in federal courts were Hispanic, a share 
larger than whites (27%) or blacks (23%).”89 “In 2007, Latinos accounted 
for 40% of all sentenced federal offenders—more than triple their share 
(13%) of the total U.S. adult population.”90 While only 1 in 106 white men 
is incarcerated, 1 in every 36 Latino men is incarcerated in the United 
States.91 Similarly, Latina women are incarcerated at 1.6 times the rate of 
white women.92 For men aged thirty-five years or older, Latinos are 
incarcerated at a greater rate than any other racial group, including 
African Americans.93 
The overrepresentation of Latinos in the criminal justice system is 
even greater in communities with significant populations of LEP Latinos, 
making the need for representative jury pools all the more important in 
these regions. For instance: 
In 2007, more than half (56%) of all Latino offenders were sentenced 
in just five of the nation’s 94 U.S. district courts. All five are located 
near the U.S.-Mexico border: the Southern (17%) and Western (15%) 
districts of Texas, the District of Arizona (11%), the Southern District 
of California (6%), and the District of New Mexico (6%).94  
When language requirements bar Latinos from jury service, the justice 
system diminishes Latino defendants’ opportunity to have a jury of their 
peers. 
 
 87. Nancy E. Walker et al., Nat’l Counsel of La Raza, Lost Opportunities: The Reality of 
Latinos in the U.S. Criminal Justice System 17 (2004); Christopher Hartney & Linh Vuong, Nat’l 
Council on Crime & Delinquency, Created Equal: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the US 
Criminal Justice System 2 (2009). 
 88. See Walker et al., supra note 87, at 16 tbl.2.1 (citing Barry Holman, Nat’l Ctr. on Insts. & Alts., 
Masking the Divide: How Officially Reported Prison Statistics Distort the Racial and Ethnic 
Realities of Prison Growth 8 (2001)) (finding over-count of white prisoners at a rate of: 26.7% in 
federal prisons, 54.1% in New Mexico, 30.8% in Arizona, 26% in Colorado, and 24.6% in New York). 
 89. Mark Hugo Lopez & Michael T. Light, Pew Hispanic Ctr., A Rising Share: Hispanics and 
Federal Crime i, 1 (2009). 
 90. Id. at i. 
 91. Jennifer Warren et al., Pew Ctr. on the States, One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008 
at 6 (2008). 
 92. Sentencing Project, Incarcerated Women 2 (2012) (citing Paul Guerino et al., Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2010 (2011)). 
 93. Walker et al., supra note 87, at 2. 
 94. Lopez & Light, supra note 89, at i, iv. 
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Racially diverse juries are important to ensure fair trials for Latino 
criminal defendants for several reasons. Diverse juries reduce racial bias in 
deliberations and interject commonsense judgment and understanding 
about minority communities, which helps counteract negative stereotyping 
about Latino criminality. Research indicates that both overt and 
unconscious racial bias can influence jury verdicts in ways that are 
damaging to criminal defendants, while the presence of racial diversity 
on juries reduces the expression of such bias and results in fairer trials.95 
Even if non-Latino jurors are not particularly biased against Latinos, 
non-Latinos often lack the “common sense judgment” and understanding 
of the community from which the Latino defendant comes. This is 
particularly salient in a trial where the crime took place in a Latino 
neighborhood. Americans remain highly segregated by race; people from 
different racial groups attend separate schools96 and live in separate 
communities.97 “Because of extreme residential segregation, whites are 
generally unaware of the realities of daily life in black and Latino 
neighborhoods.”98 Latino communities are some of the most insular and 
racially isolated neighborhoods.99 Without exposure to Latino life, non-
Latino jurors likely have limited ability to understand a Latino 
defendant’s community and culture. This lack of familiarity can lead to 
harmful results. 
For example, imagine that a defendant comes from an urban low-
income Latino neighborhood, and defense counsel asserts as an alibi that 
at the time of the crime, the defendant was at a liquor store purchasing 
food for his family’s dinner. A juror unfamiliar with defendant’s 
neighborhood would likely apply her own experience and that of the 
people she knows and perhaps conclude the following: “I don’t buy food 
 
 95. See Vidmar, supra note 2, at 1974 (noting how racially mixed juries engage in longer 
deliberations, discuss a wider range of information, and are more accurate in their statements about 
the case); see also Daniel H. Swett, Cultural Bias in the American Legal System, 4 Law & Soc’y Rev. 
79, 97–100 (1969). 
 96. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The 
Case of Deregulated Education, 50 Duke L.J. 753, 788 (2000). As a result of residential housing 
segregation, public schools are more segregated today than they ever were before. Id. This is 
particularly true for Latinos. Id. Eighty percent of Latino children attend schools that are majority 
nonwhite (where fifty to one hundred percent are nonwhite) and forty-three percent attend intensely 
segregated schools (where zero to ten percent of the students are white). Gary Orfield et al., Civil 
Rights Project, E Pluribus . . . Separation: Deepening Double Segregation for More Students 9 
(2012). 
 97. Beverly Daniel Tatum, Can We Talk About Race?: And Other Conversations in an Era 
of School Resegregation 13 (2007) (“Most African Americans, Latinos, and Whites still live in 
neighborhoods with people from their same racial group.”). 
 98. William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: An Introduction, 
100 Ky. L.J. 1, 13 (2011). 
 99. See Orfield et al., supra note 96, at 9. For instance, in the greater Los Angeles area roughly 
thirty percent of Latinos attend a school where whites comprise one percent or less of the student 
body. Id. 
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at a liquor store and neither does anyone I know. Therefore, defendant 
must be lying. If she’s lying, she must be guilty.” Someone familiar with 
the defendant’s (or a similar) neighborhood might recognize that it is 
located in a “food desert” where liquor stores are one of the few places 
in the vicinity that carry groceries.100 A juror with knowledge of the 
defendant’s specific community or similar communities could share this 
during deliberations and refute an assumption of guilt based solely upon 
lying about the food selection at a liquor store. Clearly, there might 
nonetheless be sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but at least that finding would not be based on a 
misguided assumption about the availability of groceries in defendant’s 
neighborhood. 
In addition to misgivings about the community that the defendant 
comes from, a racial majority juror might not be familiar with the 
defendant’s culture or cultural expressions. For instance, imagine that 
during trial, photographs of the defendant reveal that he has tattoos of a 
cross, the Virgin of Guadalupe, and “Mexicano” or “Chicano” written in 
Old English lettering. A juror who has never known anyone with such 
tattoos might associate them with gang-style tattoos that one sees in 
movies, rather than more accurately assuming that they simply represent 
religious devotion, cultural pride, or local style. 
To fill in the void of actual knowledge and familiarity, jurors might 
instead rely upon media portrayals or prevalent stereotypes about 
Latinos that are overwhelmingly negative.101 Despite the fact that Latinos 
are now the largest racial minority in the United States, there are still few 
positive media examples of Latinos. A 2000 study by the National 
Council of La Raza and the National Association of Hispanic Journalists 
revealed that only 0.53% of “network television news stories focused on 
issues related to Hispanics” and that of “these stories, 80% focused on 
just four topics—immigration, affirmative action, crime, and drugs—
 
 100.  “Food deserts” are areas that lack grocery stores that sell fresh food and are inundated with 
liquor, convenience, and fast food stores. See Christopher J. Curran & Marc-Tizoc González, Food 
Justice as Interracial Justice: Urban Farmers, Community Organizations and the Role of Government in 
Oakland, California, 43 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 207, 215 (2011). See generally Andrea Freeman, 
Fast Food: Oppression Through Poor Nutrition, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 2221 (2007). 
 101. See Walker et al., supra note 87, at 2 (“Although rarely covered in the media, when 
Hispanics are shown they typically are portrayed as having problems, being criminals, or being a 
problem to mainstream White society.”). A study conducted by Pitzer College examined one week of 
television network programming in 1992 and found that seventy-five percent of Hispanic characters 
were depicted as being in a lower socioeconomic class versus twenty-four percent of blacks and 
seventeen percent of whites. Id. “The study’s authors concluded: ‘In general, African Americans are 
portrayed positively on prime-time TV. . . . Latinos were more likely described as powerless and 
stupid.’” Id. (alteration in original). 
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stories in which Latinos were likely to be portrayed in negative roles.”102 
The rare instances in which Latinos are portrayed in a positive light often 
erase their Latino identity. An example is the 2012 Academy Award 
winning movie Argo, based on the true story of celebrated Mexican 
American Central Intelligence Agency agent Tony Mendez who 
facilitated the rescue of diplomats during the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979. 
Although the film glorifies Mendez, he is played by a white actor (Ben 
Affleck) and the film makes no mention of his Latino heritage aside from 
one reference to his Spanish surname.103 Hollywood’s erasure of 
Mendez’s Latino heritage is injurious to Latinos, especially given that the 
majority of portrayals of Latinos in the media are derogatory.104 
Moreover, due to perceived foreignness, Latinos are not only 
vulnerable to stereotyping about their cultural groups in the United States; 
they are also associated with foreign stereotypes. Such stereotyping 
contrasts the experience of white Americans, who are generally not 
associated with their ancestor culture. The largest population of Latinos 
in the United States is of Mexican descent,105 including Chicanos whose 
ancestors became U.S. citizens by virtue of the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo that gave the United States one-third of its current land mass.106 
Despite this 150-year history of Mexican Americans being U.S. citizens, 
Mexican Americans are often treated as foreign even in the states that 
were once part of Mexico.107 Thus, in addition to negative stereotyping 
about Mexican Americans, this group is also associated with negative 
stereotypes about Mexican nationals.  
The past few years have marked a tremendous upsurge in the 
coverage of violent drug- and gang-related crime in Mexico, which has 
led the U.S. Department of State to issue travel warnings for border 
towns like Tijuana, Mexico, despite the fact that Tijuana has a lower rate 
 
 102. Id. at 4. See generally Federico Subervi et al., Nat’l Assoc. of Hispanic Journalists, 
Network Brownout Report 2005: The Portrayal of Latinos & Latino Issues on Network 
Television News, 2004 with a Retrospect to 1995 (2005). 
 103. Moctesuma Esparza, Ben Affleck’s Argo and the White-Washing of the Mexican-American, 
BeyondChron (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.beyondchron.org/news/index.php?itemid=10760. 
 104. See Christina Iturralde, Rhetoric and Violence: Understanding Incidents of Hate Against 
Latinos, 12 N.Y. City L. Rev. 417, 420 (2009). 
 105. Seth Motel & Eileen Patten, Pew Hispanic Ctr., Characteristics of the 60 Largest 
Metropolitan Areas by Hispanic Population 5 (2012) (“Mexican-Americans are by far the nation’s 
largest Hispanic origin group, comprising 65% of the total Hispanic population in the United States.”). 
 106. See Richard Delgado, Locating Latinos in the Field of Civil Rights: Assessing the Neoliberal 
Case for Radical Exclusion, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 489, 493 n.18 (2004) (reviewing George Yancey, Who is 
White?: Latinos, Asians, and the New Black/Nonblack Divide (2003)) (citing Juan Perea et al., 
Race and Races: Cases and Resources for a Diverse America 248 (2000)). 
 107. See Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and the Mexican-
American Experience, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, 1268 (1997). 
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of murder and carjacking than Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.108 Mexican 
Americans, and often Latinos of all backgrounds, are perceived as 
“Mexican,” and considered more criminally inclined than ever due to this 
report about crime in Mexico, despite the fact that Latinos are 
statistically less likely to be involved in violent crime than any other 
racial group.109 
In the absence of actual familiarity with Latinos and positive or 
accurate media representation of Latinos, white and other non-Latino 
jurors might interpret manners, dress, or other attributes, or just the 
phenotype and complexion of a Latino defendant or witness, to be 
associated with criminality and a lack of credibility. Looking Latino or 
Mexican is too often associated with appearing criminal or dishonest, 
because these are the prior dominant visual associations that a majority 
juror might possess. Thus, it is particularly important that Latino criminal 
defendants have a jury derived from a pool that contains a representative 
number of “peers.” 
B. Limited English Proficient Citizens 
Next to voting, jury service is the most celebrated responsibility of 
U.S. citizenship.110 Serving on a jury is a rare opportunity to participate 
directly in an institution of democracy and the legal system. As the 
Supreme Court noted in J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel. T.B., participation in 
the fair administration of justice “reaffirms the promise of equality under 
the law—that all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the 
chance to take part directly in our democracy.”111 Thus, jury service 
provides an important opportunity for minority groups—who might not 
have strong support from the legislature or society in general—to directly 
partake in and influence the justice system.112 
People who are excluded from jury service are typically those 
individuals whom society does not consider to be full citizens: they do 
not have formal citizenship status, are not adults, have prior criminal 
convictions and have not had their civil rights fully restored, or are 
deemed to have poor moral character.113 By including individuals who do 
not have sufficient English language proficiency into the group of persons 
precluded from jury service, LEP U.S. citizens are essentially made to 
share the same status as non-citizens, infants, felons, and persons of 
 
 108. Jordan Rane, World’s 10 Most Hated Cities, CNN Travel (June 11, 2012), 
http://travel.cnn.com/explorations/life/most-hated-cities-861160. 
 109. Walker et al., supra note 87, at 4. 
 110. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991). 
 111. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 407). 
 112. Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women’s Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of 
Difference?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1115, 1122–23 (1994). 
 113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2012). 
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immoral character—a tremendous harm to the dignity of LEP individuals. 
Such exclusions and juror qualification requirements suggest to LEP 
citizens that they are not fit to sit in judgment of legal disputes and 
criminal justice issues that affect their communities.114  
Permitting LEP jurors to serve with the assistance of interpreters 
instills the value that “sharing in the administration of justice is a phase 
of civic responsibility.”115 Allowing LEP jurors to serve in the jury box 
would increase democratic participation for significant portions of the 
population. Moreover, increased democratic participation vis-à-vis jury 
service would strengthen the connection of racial minorities to their 
respective communities.116 Data shows that participation in democratic 
activities positively influences individual attitudes toward the law and 
confidence in the legal system.117 Thus, for Latino individuals who 
already experience alienation from the community because of language 
ability or societal animus toward immigrants and those perceived to be 
immigrants, jury participation presents an opportunity to connect Latinos 
to the broader communities in which they reside. Through inclusion in—
rather than exclusion from—democratic activities, Latinos might also gain 
a greater sense of pride in the American political and legal systems, and 
consequently be more likely to vote and participate in public affairs, as 
well as experience increased confidence in the legal system. 
C. The Perceived Integrity and Fairness of the Legal System 
Racially unrepresentative juries pose risks to the perceived integrity 
and fairness of the legal system.118 As such, excluding Latinos on the basis 
of language contributes to an undermining of public confidence in the 
fairness of the criminal justice system. Because juries serve such an 
important function in our justice system, “[r]estricting jury service to only 
special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in 
the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of a 
jury trial.”119 Studies reveal that the overwhelming majority of the public 
feels that jury decisions reached by racially diverse juries are fairer than 
decisions reached by single race juries.120 This is especially true for 
Latinos, who have the highest belief (of any racial group) in the value of 
 
 114. Id. Exclusion on the basis of English ability is stigmatizing and reduces LEP citizens to second 
class citizenship status. See Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear 
of Spanish, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 48 (1992). 
 115. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurt, J., dissenting). 
 116. Fukurai, supra note 60, at 12. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 10–11. (“Many believe that an all-White grand jury will be biased against a 
Black defendant, or will favor a White defendant who is accused of a crime against a Black victim.”). 
 119. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
 120. Hiroshi Fukurai & Richard Kooth, Race in the Jury Box: Affirmative Action in Jury 
Selection 128 (2003). 
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diverse juries.121 Conversely, nearly fifty percent of Latinos express 
distrust toward the criminal justice system.122 Therefore, verdicts 
rendered by representative juries (which include LEP individuals) would 
be perceived as more legitimate and would increase public respect for 
the criminal justice and court systems, which would in turn preserve “just 
government power and authority.”123 
As discussed above, eighty-seven percent of LEP individuals living 
in the United States are persons of color. When English language 
requirements result in the removal of large segments of populations of 
color from the jury pool, jury pools no longer reflect a fair cross section 
of the community (as required by the Sixth Amendment), which 
effectively denies criminal defendants the opportunity to be tried by a 
jury of their peers.124 Further, strict language requirements also preclude 
LEP citizens from participating in a primary self-government function, 
relegating them to second-class citizenship status in the court system. 
Finally, racially unrepresentative juries undermine the perceived 
legitimacy and authority of the courts.125 The problems posed by English 
language juror requirements implicate fundamental rights and core 
citizenship functions that warrant rigorous constitutional examination. 
III.  The Constitutionality of Juror Language Requirements 
Juror language requirements simultaneously infringe upon a 
criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial and LEP citizens’ right to 
participate in self-governance vis-à-vis a jury panel. These language 
requirements also threaten the perceived fairness and ultimately the 
power of the courts and legal system to administer justice effectively. The 
exclusion of LEP citizens from jury service on the basis of their English 
ability implicates several sources of law: particularly the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its Fifth Amendment 
equivalent, and the fair cross section requirement of the Sixth 
Amendment. Analysis of English language juror requirements shows that 
civil rights jurisprudence is not prepared to address the unique issues 
faced by Latinos who experience discrimination and oppression in 
different ways than African Americans, the population that civil rights 
laws were originally designed to protect. 
 
 121. Id. at 129. 
 122. Mark Hugo Lopez & Gretchen Livingston, Pew Hispanic Ctr., Hispanics and the 
Criminal Justice System: Low Confidence, High Exposure 1 (2009). 
 123. Fukurai & Kooth, supra note 120, at 133. 
 124. Hiroshi Fukarai, Social De-Construction of Race and Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 
11 La Raza L.J. 17, 46 (1999). 
 125. Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror 
Race on Jury Decisions, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 63, 77 (1993). 
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A. Equal Protection 
Scholars and the courts generally evaluate language discrimination 
claims under laws that have been established to protect racial and ethnic 
minorities, such as equal protection and Titles VI and VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968.126 This is not surprising due to the close and often 
inextricable relationship between language and race or ethnicity and the 
lack of explicit protection for minority language status or usage. However, 
language discrimination claims can be difficult to establish under equal 
protection law because this doctrine was developed without full 
contemplation of the diverse manifestations of racial and ethnic 
oppression in the United States. Equal protection jurisprudence was 
initially developed to address racial discrimination against blacks where 
language was not a central concern.127 Although there might be implicit 
recognition that language is related to race and ethnicity, or even that 
language discrimination can be a manifestation of underlying racial or 
ethnic discrimination, it is difficult to succeed on language-based claims 
under this jurisprudential rubric. Equal protection law is one of the most 
important constraints on government-sponsored racial and ethnic 
discrimination, but this doctrine has been slow to recognize language-
based racial and ethnic discrimination. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
in relevant part that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”128 It is also well established 
that there is an implied equal protection component to the Fifth 
Amendment that imposes the same obligation on the federal 
government.129 Therefore, a LEP citizen who is excluded from jury 
service (or more likely a criminal defendant raising a third-party claim on 
behalf of the excluded citizen or citizens)130 on the basis of their deficient 
English language ability could bring an equal protection claim 
challenging an English language juror requirement. However, due to the 
limited development and protection of language-based discrimination in 
the courts, these claims are difficult to assert and have consistently failed. 
For instance, if a LEP Spanish-speaking Latina is excluded from 
jury service on the basis of her English language deficiency, she might 
challenge this inequality of treatment on a variety of grounds, each of 
 
 126. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a 
Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 161 (2001). 
 127. See Richard Delgado et al., Authors’ Reply: Creating and Documenting a New Field of Legal 
Study, 12 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 103, 105, 107 (2009). 
 128. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 129.  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 
497, 500 (1954). 
 130. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). (“[A] defendant in a criminal case can raise the 
third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded.”). 
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which would pose difficulties. One approach would be to challenge a juror 
language requirement solely on the basis of language discrimination 
without any reference to the excluded citizen’s race, ethnicity, or national 
origin. The citizen (or defendant raising a third party claim on her behalf) 
could argue that a requirement commanding that a juror read, write, 
speak, and understand English in order to serve on a jury classifies, 
excludes and discriminates against her on the basis of her language 
minority status, and thus violates her equal protection rights. However, 
language classifications or requirements, without more, are not subject to 
any heightened constitutional review.131 Furthermore, although the right 
to serve on a jury is well established and celebrated, it has yet to be 
recognized as a fundamental right.132 Thus, without the recognition of 
language minorities as a suspect class or the implication of an established 
fundamental right, the language requirement that jurors speak English is 
subject to rational basis review. Under rational basis review, a court asks 
whether the government has a legitimate reason for the language 
requirement that is rationally linked to it.133 Here, the government has 
plausible reasons for requiring that jurors speak English: because English 
is the language of state and federal court proceedings, such requirements 
help jurors understand these proceedings and engage in deliberations 
without additional expense or concerns about the accuracy of language 
interpretation. 
Now let us suppose that the same LEP Spanish-speaking citizen 
challenges an English language juror requirement on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, or national origin. Unlike language classifications, race, ethnicity, 
and national origin are subject to strict scrutiny.134 To pass strict scrutiny, a 
law must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, be narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest, and be the least restrictive means for 
achieving that interest.135 Because juror language accommodation has 
been successfully employed as a method of allowing jurors to serve 
despite their English language abilities, it is likely that juror language 
requirements would fail strict scrutiny because a blanket exclusion of 
LEP individuals is not the least restrictive means to ensure that jurors 
sufficiently understand proceedings and engage in meaningful 
deliberations. However, plaintiff’s obstacles to obtaining such a ruling 
 
 131. It should be noted that strong arguments have been advanced for recognizing and protecting 
language as a suspect classification distinct from race, ethnicity, and national origin, but this is not the 
current state of the law. See Rodríguez, supra note 126. 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Conant, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1020 (E.D. Wis. 2000); Rubio v. 
Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 602 (Cal. 1979). However, persuasive arguments have been advanced 
that jury service is a fundamental right of citizenship. See Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-
Based Peremptory Challenges, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1920, 1928 (1992). 
 133. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 134. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
 135. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
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are twofold. First, she would have to establish a sufficient link between 
language and race, ethnicity, or national origin. Second, the intent 
requirement of the equal protection doctrine would need to be satisfied. 
1. The Relationship Between Language and Race, Ethnicity, 
National Origin, and the Law 
The relationship between language and race, ethnicity, and national 
origin is recognized in socio-legal scholarship and everyday life.136 
Nevertheless, the law’s recognition of this connection has been slow to 
develop. Statutory law such as Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 has recognized language rights and their connection with race, 
ethnicity, and national origin, but interpretations of constitutional law 
has not. Consequently, legal treatment of language discrimination and its 
connection to race and national origin has been inconsistent. This 
Subpart first explores the relationship between language and racial 
identity in the context of Latinos in the United States, and then examines 
the intersections between language discrimination and race discrimination 
under equal protection law. 
There are strong connections between race, ethnicity, national 
origin, and ancestral languages for many groups, but since Latinos are 
the largest minority group, focus on the experience of this population is 
timely and appropriate. Race, ethnicity, national origin, and the Spanish 
language are inextricably linked for Latinos. The Spanish language is 
central to Latino identity, and discrimination on the basis of language has 
been a primary method of discriminating against and subordinating 
Latinos in the United States.137 
Language “defines the essence of cultural identity.”138 For the 
majority of Latinos, Spanish is core to their racial and cultural identity. 
Even the Supreme Court has recognized that in localities with substantial 
Latino populations, “a significant percentage of the Latino population 
speaks fluent Spanish, and that many consider it their preferred 
language, the one chosen for personal communication, the one selected 
for speaking with the most precision and power, the one used to define 
the self.”139 The ties between Spanish and Latino identity extend beyond 
the fact that Spanish is a primary language for many Latinos. Even native 
English-speaking Latinos often identify culturally through the Spanish 
language. Mixing Spanish words with dominant English or the use of 
 
 136. See, e.g., Perea, supra note 10, at 1432–34. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Rodríguez, supra note 126, at 141; see J.A. Fishman, Language and Ethnicity, in Language, 
Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations 15, 25 (Howard Giles ed., 1977). 
 139. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363–64 (1991) (emphasis added). 
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varying forms of “Spanglish” are ways to distinguish oneself as Latino/a 
and create a sense of shared group identity.140 
Racism against Latinos is often related to the use of the Spanish 
language, accent, or surname.141 This is different from the African 
American experience, which has focused on discrimination based on 
color and phenotype.142 Certainly, Latinos are also subject to identification 
and discrimination based upon physical characteristics. In fact, United 
States Supreme Court cases and recent laws such as Arizona’s Senate Bill 
1070 make “Mexican appearance” acceptable grounds for racial profiling 
by police to inquire about the lawfulness of one’s presence on American 
soil.143 This is despite the fact that these laws are enforced in geographic 
areas with high, if not majority, Mexican-American or Chicano 
populations, and on land that used to be Mexico.144 Like blacks, Latinos 
are often identified by their “looks” and are consequently subject to 
derogatory treatment and racial profiling. Racist cartoons depict Latinos 
with certain exaggerated physical features. Derogatory names such as 
“spic,” “wetback,” and “beaner” have been employed in similar fashion 
to the “N word” against blacks.145 
However, discrimination against Latinos is often manifested 
through the Spanish language. The law does not redress much of this 
discrimination because it is not based upon physical features or skin color 
the way that discrimination often manifests against blacks. Majority white 
culture in the United States has historically viewed Spanish speakers as 
low-class and unintelligent,146 and Spanish speaking and bilingual Spanish-
English speaking Latino youth have been treated as having no language.147 
Latino children who speak Spanish at school have been subject to ridicule, 
corporal punishment, “Spanish detention” and suspension.148 Latino 
parents have faced allegations of abuse and neglect for speaking Spanish 
to their children and have been ordered by courts to cease speaking 
Spanish to their children at risk of losing custody or contact with their 
 
 140. See Jason Rothman & Amy Beth Rell, A Linguistic Analysis of Spanglish: Relating Language 
to Identity, 1 Linguistics & Hum. Sci. 515, 526 (2005). 
 141. Andrew W. Bribriesco, Note, Latino/a Plaintiffs and the Intersection of Stereotypes, 
Unconscious Bias, Race-Neutral Policies, and Personal Injury, 13 J. Gender Race & Just. 373, 378 
(2010) (citing Richard Delgado et al., Latinos and the Law: Cases and Materials 3 (2008)). 
 142. See Richard Delgado et al., Latinos and the Law: Cases and Materials 290–91, 297–98 
(2008); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Racial Double Helix: Watson, Crick, and Brown v. 
Board of Education, 47 How. L.J. 473, 489–90 (2004). 
 143. Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 Geo. 
Immigr. L.J. 47, 67 (2010) (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975)). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Bret D. Asbury, Anti-Snitching Norms and Community Loyalty, 89 Or. L. Rev. 1257, 1294 
n.158 (2011). 
 146. Bribriesco, supra note 141, at 401. 
 147. Perea, supra note 10, at 1432. 
 148. Id. at 1443. 
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children.149 People have been fired from their jobs for speaking Spanish 
at work, even at break time where no customers were present.150 
Although often cast as an immigrant phenomenon, subordination of 
Latinos on the basis of Spanish language is not merely an immigration 
issue. Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans whose families have 
resided for centuries in what is now the United States have endured a 
conquest of their land and culture through laws and policies that compel 
assimilation.151 The central component of coerced and sometimes forced 
assimilation has been the learning of English and forgoing of Spanish. 
This sacrifice comes at a personal cost and is ultimately detrimental to 
the nation which could benefit domestically and compete better 
internationally with a more multilingual citizenry. 
As Brown v. Board of Education152 and the civil rights movement of 
the 1960s demonstrated, a central manifestation of racism in this country 
has been through the segregation of races in education. Like African 
Americans, Latinos were subject to educational segregation (assigning 
students to separate schools based upon race) during the Jim Crow era.153 
The effects of this segregation were the same as for blacks: a feeling of 
inferiority, and limited educational opportunities and career 
advancement.154 However, unlike the segregation of blacks, the segregation 
of Latinos was largely couched in the pretext of language. In the 
Southwest, segregation of Mexican Americans—the country’s largest 
Latino population—was justified on the basis of the students’ allegedly 
deficient language abilities.155 However, English language ability was not 
 
 149. Id. at 1445 (citing Stephen W. Bender, Greasers and Gringos: Latinos, Law, and the 
American Imagination 88–94 (2003)). 
 150. See Perea supra note 10, at 1433. 
 151. See Richard Delgado, The Current Landscape of Race: Old Targets, New Opportunities, 104 
Mich. L. Rev. 1269, 1285 (2006). 
 152. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 153. See, e.g., Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947) (finding the racial 
segregation of Latino children in California schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 154. In Mendez v. Westminster School District, the district court found that “the methods of 
segregation prevalent in the defendant school districts foster antagonisms in the children and suggest 
inferiority among them where none exists.” Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 549 
(S.D. Cal. 1946), aff’d sub nom. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774. In Brown, the Supreme Court held that 
“[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the 
colored children. . . . A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with 
the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of 
negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated 
school system.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 155. See Mendez, 64 F. Supp. at 549; Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1930); Robert R. Álvarez, Jr., The Lemon Grove Incident: The Nation’s First Successful Desegregation 
Court Case, 32 J. San Diego Hist. no. 2, 1986, at 116 available at 
http://sandiegohistory.org/journal/86spring/lemongrove.htm (citing Petition for Writ of Mandate, 
Álvarez v. Lemon Grove Sch. Dist. (1931) (No. 66625)); see also Lupe S. Salinas, Linguaphobia, 
Language Rights, and the Right of Privacy, 3 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 53, 63–65 (2007); Guadalupe Salinas, 
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determined through an assessment of the pupil’s English language skills. 
Rather, the student’s physical appearance or Spanish surname was 
enough to determine that the student belonged in the “Mexican” school 
instead of the school reserved for whites.156 The law has facilitated this 
societal discrimination by failing to recognize the connection between 
language and race discrimination and declining to intervene when 
language restrictions are a pretext for racial, ethnic, or national origin 
discrimination. 
The relationship of language to race, ethnicity, and national origin is 
unsettled in the sphere of constitutional law.157 The Supreme Court has 
not squarely addressed the question of whether language discrimination 
amounts to discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national 
origin under the Equal Protection Clause. In the few language-based 
equal protection cases that have reached the Court, it has often ruled on 
alternative statutory or constitutional grounds. For instance, in Lau v. 
Nichols, LEP children of Chinese ancestry claimed that the San Francisco 
school district’s failure to provide ESL instruction deprived them of equal 
educational opportunities under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.158 The Court did not reach the Equal 
Protection Clause arguments and relied solely on Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act when it found that the failure to provide Chinese-speaking 
students ESL instruction had prevented their access to a meaningful 
education.159 Thus, the Court found that the Chinese-speaking minority 
group had been denied a federally funded educational benefit on the 
basis of their national origin or race in violation of Title VI.160 
Other language discrimination cases before the Supreme Court have 
been resolved on the grounds that parents have a fundamental due 
process right to educate their children in their language of choice.161 In 
Meyer v. Nebraska, for example, the plaintiff was charged with violating 
a statute that prohibited the teaching of modern foreign languages to 
elementary-aged children.162 The Nebraska Supreme Court found that 
the statute did not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment but was a 
valid exercise of police power on the grounds that the purpose of the 
statute was “that the English language should be and become the mother 
 
Comment, Mexican-Americans and the Desegregation of Schools in the Southwest, 8 Hous. L. Rev. 929, 
939 (1971). 
 156. Mendez v. Westminster: For all the Children/Para Todos los Niños (KOCE 2002). 
 157.  See Josh Hill et al., Watch your Language! The Kansas Law Review Survey of Official-
English and English-Only Laws and Policies, 57 U. Kan. L. Rev. 669, 708 (2009). 
 158. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
 159. Id. at 566. 
 160. Id. at 568. 
 161. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 
(1927). 
 162. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397. 
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tongue of all children reared in [the] state.”163 The plaintiff challenged his 
conviction for teaching biblical stories to a parochial school student in 
German under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.164 
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the statute on the grounds that 
parents have the right to have their children taught heritage languages,165 
and noted that the protection of the Constitution extends “to those who 
speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the 
tongue.”166 
Similarly, in Farrington v. Tokushige, the Supreme Court struck 
down a statute that severely regulated and effectively prohibited the 
teaching of a language other than English or Hawaiian, without a permit, 
payment of fees, and demonstration that the permit applicant “is 
possessed of the ideals of democracy; knowledge of American history 
and institutions, and knows how to read, write and speak the English 
language,” and the signing of a pledge that she would “direct the minds 
and studies of pupils in such schools as will tend to make them good and 
loyal American citizens.”167 The Court struck down the statute on the 
ground that it deprived “parents of fair opportunity to procure for their 
children instruction which they think important” because the “Japanese 
parent has the right to direct the education of his own child without 
unreasonable restrictions.”168 Thus, these opinions acknowledged the 
different race, ethnicity, or national origin of the language minorities 
affected by the language restrictions but focused more on parental rights 
than language rights.169 
In the most recent Supreme Court language discrimination case, 
Hernandez v. New York, the Court faced the issue of whether Spanish 
ability bears such a close relation to ethnicity that exercising a peremptory 
challenge on the basis of Spanish-speaking ability violates equal 
protection, but chose not to address the issue directly.170 Hernandez dealt 
with a criminal trial of a Latino defendant in a heavily Latino and Spanish-
speaking area171 where Spanish language testimony would be presented.172 
The prosecutor used four peremptory challenges to exclude potential 
 
 163. Id. at 398. 
 164. Id. at 396–97. 
 165. Id. at 401–02. 
 166. Id. at 401. 
 167. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S 284, 293–94 (1927). 
 168. Id. at 298. 
 169. See generally Sandra Del Valle, Language Rights and the Law in the United States: 
Finding Our Voices (2003). 
 170. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 353 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
 171. Anthony Fassano, Note, The Rashomon Effect, Jury Instructions, and Peremptory Challenges: 
Rethinking Hernandez v. New York, 41 Rutgers L.J. 783, 792 (2010). 
 172. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355–56. 
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Latino jurors.173 The prosecutor claimed that he had struck two of the 
jurors who were Spanish-English bilingual because he was not certain 
that they would follow the English translation of evidence.174 Ultimately, 
no Latino served on the jury despite the high population of Latinos and 
Spanish speakers in the jurisdiction.175 Hernandez was the first Batson 
challenge by a Latino brought before the Court.176 
The analyses of the Hernandez plurality opinion, concurrence, and 
dissents focused on whether the prosecutor’s explanation was race-neutral. 
The separate opinions reflect different approaches to determining whether 
there is a sufficient nexus between race and language that would warrant a 
finding of an equal protection violation. Justice O’Connor presented a 
highly formalistic approach that severed language from race. In her 
concurring opinion joined by Justice Scalia, Justice O’Connor stated that 
“[n]o matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the 
explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does not implicate 
the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race.”177 
This approach can be compared with Justice Kennedy’s plurality 
opinion in Hernandez, which recognized that language discrimination can 
be sufficiently linked to race or ethnicity so as to implicate the shelter of 
equal protection.178 Despite upholding the use of peremptory strikes of 
potential jurors who were bilingual and without resolving “the more 
difficult question of the breadth with which the concept of race should be 
defined for equal protection purposes,”179 Justice Kennedy acknowledged 
the close relationship between race and language. He noted that an 
individual’s language can elicit a response from others that ranges from 
“distance and alienation, to ridicule and scorn. . . . the latter type all too 
often result[ing] from or initiat[ing] racial hostility.”180 Justice Kennedy 
further stated that “[i]t may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in 
some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin 
color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection 
analysis.”181 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that there might be a 
“locality” where a “significant percentage of the Latino population 
speaks fluent Spanish” and in fact prefer communicating in Spanish 
rather than English.182 In such a locality, “a prosecutor’s persistence in 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Andrew McGuire, Comment, Peremptory Exclusion of Spanish-Speaking Jurors: Could 
Hernandez v. New York Happen Here?, 23 N.M. L. Rev. 467, 467 (1993); Fassano, supra note 171, at 792. 
 176. McGuire, supra note 175, at 470. 
 177. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 178. Id. at 371 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 363–64 (plurality opinion). 
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the desire to exclude Spanish-speaking jurors,” despite any juror 
instructions to follow the English translation or to inform the judge if the 
translation is incorrect “could be taken into account in determining 
whether to accept a race-neutral explanation for the challenge.”183 
In a dissent by Justice Stevens and joined formally by Justice Marshall 
and by reference by Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens recognized an 
inherent relationship between race and language.184 Stevens found that the 
prosecutor’s justifications proffered for striking the bilingual jurors were 
“insufficient to dispel the existing inference of racial animus” because the 
justification “would inevitably result in a disproportionate disqualification 
of Spanish-speaking venirepersons.”185 He notes that “[a]n explanation 
that is ‘race neutral’ on its face is nonetheless unacceptable if it is merely 
a proxy for a discriminatory practice.”186 The dissent appears to 
appreciate the obvious connection between the bilingual jurors’ Spanish 
language abilities and Latino background. This approach is in line with 
interpretations of Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which have recognized language discrimination as a form of national 
origin discrimination.187 
2. Intent Requirement 
To prevail on a language-based equal protection claim, a plaintiff 
must satisfy the intent requirement and prove a connection between the 
language discrimination and her race, ethnicity, or nation of origin. In 
other words, a plaintiff must show that in enacting the juror language 
requirement, the government intended to discriminate against the class 
of persons to which the plaintiff belongs.188 This is challenging to prove 
under the Court’s narrow view of intent, and such claims have generally 
not been successful.189 First, racism has become highly sophisticated. 
Even though on-the-ground English-only movements that prompt 
legislation are often blatantly racist,190 legislative history is devoid of 
explicit expressions of racial intolerance. Even if the intent is to exclude 
a group of Latinos (such as a backlash against recent immigration or a 
bloom of nativist sentiment), there is no smoking-gun evidence of this in 
the legislative record. 
The primary reason that courts have not found the intent 
requirement to be satisfied is that, on its face, a language requirement 
 
 183. Id. at 364. 
 184. Id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. E.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
 188. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 189. See, e.g., State v. Haugen, 243 P.3d 31 (Or. 2010). 
 190. Salinas, supra note 33, at 918. 
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applies to all LEP persons, not just speakers of certain languages.191 
Although a requirement that only targeted Spanish speakers would be 
found to demonstrate intent to discriminate against Latinos,192 
discrimination against all people who do not meet certain English language 
speaking, reading, or writing skill levels is considered race neutral because 
it applies to all people with English deficiencies.193 
Further, even if it can be clearly shown that a language requirement 
has a tremendous disparate impact on one group as opposed to society at 
large, that disparate impact is still not sufficient under equal protection 
doctrine. The Supreme Court has established that the Equal Protection 
Clause only renders unconstitutional express racial discrimination and 
not those laws that merely have a distinctly disparate effect on a racial 
group.194 Thus a facially neutral law, like juror language requirement, is not 
violative of equal protection despite the fact that it might have a strikingly 
“disproportionate impact” on Latinos or other racial minority groups. 
Despite significant criticism of this approach,195 it is not likely that this line 
of cases will be overturned soon, which emphasizes the importance of 
engaging in a rigorous analytical inquiry into intent that comports with the 
true constitutional meaning of equal protection under the law.  
3. Critical Originalism 
To counter the current myopic view of intentionality, this Article 
proposes “Critical Originalism” as a new method of ascertaining the 
discriminatory intent of a statute or procedural rule for Equal Protection 
purposes. Critical Originalism is the melding of anti-subordination 
deconstruction principles of Critical Race Theory with the interpretive 
methodology of Originalism Theory. At first glance, the coupling of 
tenets of Critical Race Theory and Originalism might seem discordant. 
Originalism is predominately touted by political conservatives, while 
those who embrace Critical Race Theory are usually politically 
progressive.196 However, applying Originalist principles of interpretation 
 
 191. See Donna F. Coltharp, Comment, Speaking the Language of Exclusion: How Equal 
Protection and Fundamental Rights Analyses Permit Language Discrimination, 28 St. Mary’s L.J. 149, 
173 (1996) (citing Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235, 237–39 (1976); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
292–93 (1987). 
 195. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 319 (1987).  
 196. See Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition and Some Problems 
for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 51 (2011) (citing a study finding that originalism “is 
strongly favored by individuals who are conservative in their political orientation”); Critical Race 
Theory xi (Kimberle Crenshaw, et al., 1995) (explaining that critical race theory is a 
“comprehensive movement in thought and life—created primarily, though not exclusively, by 
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under a lens of Critical Race Theory can help reveal the racially 
discriminatory intent behind colorblind laws. However, unlike traditional 
Originalists, whose starting point is a text’s plain meaning, a criticalist 
approach asks us to be concerned about minority subordination, and thus 
questions facial neutrality and delves below a law’s epidermis to discern 
its true original aim and impetus. 
Under a Critical Originalist analysis, the existence of discriminatory 
intent behind a statutory requirement is ascertained by examining the 
original intent and meaning of the requirement at the point of the 
requirement’s initial manifestation, which might well precede the 
initiation of the bill that gave rise to the statute. If the origination of the 
racially subordinating provision predates passage of the instant statute or 
rule and was motivated by discrimination, it should be determined 
whether there has been acknowledgement, denunciation, and 
remediation of the prior discriminatory intent, or if passage of the law at 
issue was a continuance of a previously discriminatory law or policy. 
Thus, Critical Race Theory sets the structural critique and scope of 
investigation, while Originalism provides the investigatory techniques. 
Critical Race Theory is centrally concerned with examining the legal 
system as an institution that perpetuates a power structure which 
privileges the majority and subordinates minorities.197 Under this view, a 
statutory provision that subordinates a racial minority group does not 
exist and operate in isolation. Traditional jurisprudence ignores this 
structural analysis and examines the discriminatory intent of a statute by 
looking narrowly at only the individual statute’s text and possibly 
legislative history.198 Under a Critical Originalist approach, rather than 
being limited merely to an inquiry into the discriminatory intent of the 
particular drafters or enactors of the law or policy at issue, a court could 
also look into the legal and political historical origins of the law or policy. 
A “new” law might actually be a continuation of similar prior laws or 
policies. A Critical Originalist approach does not view the creation of a 
law as an insular event that begins with the introduction of a bill and 
ends with its enactment, but instead looks back to the origination of the 
law. If the current law imposes a requirement that subordinates a racial 
group, a court should look back to when the requirement was initially 
imposed. At that point of origination, the original intent of the drafters 
and the original meaning of the requirement should be examined. 
 
progressive intellectuals of color—[which] compels us to confront critically the most explosive issue in 
American civilization: the historical centrality and complicity of law in upholding white supremacy”).  
 197. Anthony E. Cook, The Spiritual Movement Towards Justice, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1007, 1008 
(1992). 
 198. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1479–80 
(1987).   
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In the context of evaluating the discriminatory intent behind juror 
language requirements, instead of looking only at the provision’s text 
and legislative history for the current juror qualification statute or 
procedural rule that contains an English language provision, the court 
should also look at the preceding English language requirements that 
applied to that jurisdiction, as well as the political backdrop that spawned 
the promulgation and continuation of such requirements, to determine 
governmental intent to discriminate. This approach is fitting because it 
acknowledges the reality that governmental action is broader than the 
motivation of individual state actors drafting and enacting a procedural 
rule or statute. Government action is institutional action. Prior laws and 
policies and their intentions, as well as early and contemporary political 
motivations, are part of the institutional ethos. This is particularly true 
when the current law or policy at issue is a continuation of previous such 
laws or policies without intervening denouncement and remediation of 
prior discriminatory aims. From a structural perspective, a discriminatory 
intent behind a legal requirement does not eviscerate merely because a 
new group of legislators decide to perpetuate the same requirement in a 
different statute or rule. 
Having set the scope of investigation into a statutory requirement’s 
discriminatory intent to the time of its origination and forward, originalist 
techniques are useful tools to determine whether such intent exists. 
Originalism is a principle of interpretation which maintains that legal text 
should be interpreted in accordance with its original meaning or intent.199 
In other words, a legal text should be interpreted to further what the text 
meant at the time of its enactment or what the drafter or enactor of the 
law intended it to mean or achieve. Originalism initially and chiefly has 
been applied to interpretation of constitutions, but it has also been applied 
to statutes.200 
Originalism has two central components: a methodological 
component (or principle of interpretation mentioned above) and a 
political one. The methodology or principal of interpretation attempts to 
determine the original intent of the drafters, meaning of the ratifiers, or 
public meaning at the time of adoption or enactment.201 The political 
component is a value judgment that the original meaning, intent, or 
understanding of the drafters/founders should be followed and that it is 
not the appropriate role of the judiciary to create, amend, or repeal laws 
 
 199. Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 Va. L. Rev. 493, 
574–75 (2013). 
 200. Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 
1, 5 (1998). 
 201. Andrew Kent, the New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 
757, 759 (2013).   
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in ways that are inconsistent with this intent.202 Critical Orginalism 
embraces the methodological approach while refuting the political 
element. Unlike traditional Originalism, Critical Originalism rejects legal 
formalism that separates legal reasoning from normative policy and 
justice. Further, Critical Originalism does not view the legislature as the 
sole purveyor of substantive justice. Rather, it recognizes that in our 
legal system the courts have an important role to serve as a check on the 
legislature’s actions, to ensure that the legislature does not produce 
discriminatory and subordinating laws, and to effectuate equal justice 
under the law. 
The methodological component of Originalism encompasses two 
central theories: Original Intent and Original Meaning.203 Original Intent 
Theory provides that in interpreting constitutional or statutory text, one 
should look at what the drafter or enactor meant and intended the 
statute to accomplish.204 Original Meaning Theory, which is closely 
related to textualism, asserts that interpretation of a legal text should be 
based on what reasonable persons at the time of its adoption would have 
understood to be the original meaning.205 Both of these theories lend 
insights into the original discriminatory intent of a statute. 
Under a Critical Original Intent Theory analysis, when a legal 
requirement or provision produces a subordinating effect, it is necessary 
to discern what the original drafters of the requirement or provision 
intended to accomplish: Did they intend to discriminate? Were they 
aware of the discriminatory effect and did they proceed in reckless 
disregard of that effect? If the current law is a continuation of a prior 
requirement or policy, did the more recent lawmakers acknowledge the 
prior discriminatory intent and effect? Did they repudiate the prior 
discriminatory intention? Did the lawmakers take steps to remediate the 
discrimination? These are important questions to ask, but can be 
challenging to answer. Drafters’ motivations for supporting or passing a 
piece of legislation or procedural rule might be diverse, contradictory, 
and transient. There might be no records specifying the legislator’s 
reasons (purported or actual) for initiating or supporting the enactment 
of a law or rule. Moreover, legislators do not work alone. Thus, while it is 
challenging to determine the intent of an individual lawmaker, it can be 
even more difficult to determine the collective original intent of the 
 
 202. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: 
Federal Courts and the Law 23–25 (1997). 
 203. Williams, supra note 199, at 574. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 575. 
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drafters. As such, contemporary Originalists have been critical of the 
Original Intent branch of Originalism.206 
Current Originalists’ criticism of Original Intent Theory shows us 
insights into reasons why it is, for practical purposes, difficult to ascertain 
the discriminatory intent of a law or rule. It is likely unreasonable to 
assume that there could be a single unified intent behind a statutory 
provision or rule, and even if there were, it would be difficult to determine 
whether there was a unified intent.207 Also, as Critical Race Theory 
scholarship has demonstrated, racism is increasingly sophisticated, implicit, 
and covert.208 It is not likely that a legislator would place race-based 
distinctions in the text of the law or overtly state a discriminatory intent 
in formal legislative history. Thus, it is fitting to engage in a more 
contextualized Original Meaning analysis. Under an Original Meaning 
analysis, one must look at the purpose, structure, and history of the law. 
A Critical Originalist would ask: What would reasonable people at the 
time of passage understand the law to mean? Would they understand the 
law to be targeting a certain group for inferior treatment? 
Applying a critical originalist analysis to juror language requirements 
is an effective method of revealing the racially discriminatory intent 
prompting and contemporarily inherent in these restrictions. A striking 
example is the English language juror requirement in the federal courts in 
Puerto Rico, a topic about which I have previously written.209 As a federal 
court, the Jury Selection and Service Act applies and requires that a juror 
speak, read, write and understand English.210 This requirement results in 
the exclusion of ninety percent of age-eligible Puerto Ricans from federal 
jury service.211 Further, the language requirement disproportionately 
eliminates Puerto Ricans of African descent from jury service.212 Although 
there is an overrepresentation of black Puerto Ricans appearing as 
criminal defendants in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto 
Rico, very few black Puerto Ricans can be found in the jury box.213 Under 
the current formalistic equal protection intent doctrine, a Puerto Rican 
plaintiff bringing an equal protection challenge against the JSSA’s 
application in the U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico would likely fail. 
Under the traditional narrow view of intent, the JSSA would not likely 
 
 206. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 983 (2009). 
 207. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611 (1999). 
 208. Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of Civil 
Rights Law?, 5 Nev. L.J. 213, 216 (2004); Lawrence, supra note 195, at 331, 340–41. 
 209. Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, The Exclusion of Non-English Speaking Jurors: Remedying a 
Century of Denial of the Sixth Amendment in the Federal Courts of Puerto Rico, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 497 (2011). 
 210. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1)–(3) (2011).  
 211. Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 498. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
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be considered to have a racially discriminatory intent because there is no 
evidence that the drafters intended to exclude or make it more difficult 
for Latinos generally, or Puerto Ricans more specifically to serve on 
juries. There is no indication that the drafters even considered language 
minorities, the connection between language and racial minorities, or 
residents of Puerto Rico214 when developing and ratifying the English 
language provision of the JSSA. Thus, as statutory language and legislative 
history appear race neutral, the juror language provision is unassailable 
under equal protection doctrine. 
 A Critical Originalist analysis deconstructs the racial neutrality of 
the JSSA’s English requirement as applied to Puerto Rico and reveals a 
different story. In determining the original intent of a statute, a Critical 
Originalist approach is cognizant of the systemic nature of racism and 
how it is institutionalized. Thus, under this approach it is essential to look 
beyond the JSSA juror qualification provision to the earliest origins of an 
English language requirement in Puerto Rico. In Puerto Rico this 
requirement is over a century old, having been first imposed shortly after 
American conquest.215 The U.S. government believed that the race, color, 
and Spanish language background of Puerto Ricans made them unsuitable 
for self-governance.216 Accordingly, Puerto Ricans were denied political 
sovereignty and voting rights, restrictions that continue today.217 The vast 
majority of Puerto Ricans were also denied the ability to serve on federal 
juries. Although virtually none of Puerto Rico’s inhabitants spoke English, 
the U.S. government mandated that the sole language of proceedings in 
federal court would be English.218 
The English language juror requirement in Puerto Rico has had 
three legal manifestations, each seamlessly leading into the next. In 1906, 
Congress issued an Act defining the qualification of jurors for service in 
the U.S. District Court of Puerto Rico.219 Among other things, this Act 
required that jurors have sufficient knowledge of the English language.220 
Next, Congress enacted the Jones Act of 1917, which granted Puerto 
Ricans statutory U.S. citizenship (a citizenship status subordinate to 
 
 214. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2). The JSSA only mentions Puerto Rico in one place that does not 
relate to the language requirement.  
 215. Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1775. See generally Frank 
Freidel, The Splendid Little War (1958); David F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (1981). 
 216. Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 515. 
 217. See Igartua v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Gary Lawson & 
Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s 
Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1123, 1163 (2009). 
 218. Organic Act (Foraker Act) of 1900, Pub. L. No. 56-191, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (“All 
pleadings and proceedings . . . shall be conducted in the English language.”). 
 219. Act of June 25, 1906, Pub. L. No. 294, ch. 3542, 34 Stat. 466 (1906).  
 220. Id. 
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constitutionally conferred citizenship since it is potentially revocable),221 
and Congress reiterated the English juror language requirement.222 The 
juror language provision of the Jones Act remained in effect until it was 
replaced in 1968 by the stricter English language requirement contained 
in the JSSA.223 
Having traced the English language juror requirement back to its 
origination, the next step of a Critical Originalist analysis is to inquire 
into the actual motivation behind the promulgation of English language 
prerequisites, the drafters’ intent in imposing these restrictions, and the 
original understanding and meaning of the language requirement. Here, 
a racially discriminatory intent to discriminate against Puerto Ricans is 
apparent. As I have explained elsewhere: 
Lawmakers’ beliefs that Puerto Ricans were racially inferior and unfit 
for self-governance not only determined colonial rule, but also 
determined the specific attributes of that government. This included 
the unilateral imposition of English as the language of the federal 
court. The English-only mandates in the federal courts simultaneously 
ensured Anglo- and Anglophone-American rule in the court and the 
exclusion of Puerto Rican participation in (although not subjugation 
to) the federal court. At the time of its implementation, Congress could 
have chosen to conduct court in Spanish or interpret the English 
proceedings into Spanish. If the United States had wanted Puerto 
Rican participation, it undoubtedly would have pursued one of these 
options. It did not. Thus, one of the original purposes of the English 
language requirement was to subordinate Puerto Ricans and wholly 
exclude the populations which the government deemed as most 
undesirable: those of African and mixed race heritage.224 
Furthermore, reasonable people at the time of the enactment of the 
1906 and 1917 juror language requirements would clearly understand that 
English-only meant no Spanish. And no Spanish meant the exclusion of 
the vast majority of Puerto Ricans from federal jury service. Due to the 
lack of English language ability among the masses, only American 
expatriates and some of the island’s most elite families would be eligible 
for jury service for the foreseeable future. 
The final step in a Critical Originalist analysis is to consider whether 
there has been any acknowledgement, renunciation, or remediation of 
 
 221. See Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 511 (citing Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux, Note, A Most 
Insular Minority: Reconsidering Judicial Deference to Unequal Treatment in Light of Puerto Rico’s 
Political Process Failure, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 797, 797–98 (2010) (“‘[T]he statutory citizenship status of 
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico . . . is not equal, full, permanent, irrevocable citizenship protected by 
the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.’”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-131, pt. 1, at 19 (1997)); 
see also Christina Duffy Burnett, “They Say I Am not an American . . .”: The Noncitizen National and 
the Law of American Empire, 48 Va. J. Int’l L. 659, 662 (2008)). 
 222. Organic Act of 1917 (Jones-Shafroth Act), Pub. L. No. 64-368, ch. 145, § 44, 39 Stat. 951 
(1917) (repealed 1968). 
 223. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1)–(3) (2011).  
 224. Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 517. 
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the prior discriminatory intent. When applied to the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Puerto Rico, the JSSA is an unbroken continuation of 
the racially discriminatory language requirements instituted in the early 
twentieth century. Application of Critical Originalism to the JSSA 
English language prerequisite applied in Puerto Rico ferrets out the 
discriminatory intent behind that requirement. Inquiry into the historical 
purpose of the English language juror requirement reveals that it was 
originally racially discriminatory and the intentional racial effects of the 
language requirement have changed little over time. The structure of the 
law instituted to subordinate Puerto Ricans, especially those of African 
descent, remains in place and is effective in carrying out its initial 
discriminatory aim. The current language requirement is simply a 
continuation of earlier racially motivated inequity. Moreover, the federal 
government has not acknowledged, renounced, or remediated this 
discrimination. The racially discriminatory intent did not dissipate when 
the statutory baton laden with racial animus was passed from the 1917 
Jones Act to the 1968 JSSA; rather, that discriminatory intent was passed 
on and the law should recognize this. A change of form and statutory 
numbering of a requirement should not be sufficient to eviscerate the 
original discriminatory intent. 
The application of a Critical Originalist inquiry reveals the racially 
discriminatory intent behind the application of the JSSA English language 
requirement in Puerto Rico. This revelation supports a strict scrutiny 
review of a LEP Latino’s equal protection claim challenging the juror 
prerequisite. Although the government might have a significant interest in 
demanding that jurors speak and understand English, the requirements are 
not sufficiently narrowly tailored when juror language accommodation is 
an available alternative. As such, it is likely that juror language 
requirements would fail strict scrutiny because a complete exclusion of 
LEP citizens is not the least restrictive means to ensure that jurors are 
competent to serve. 
B. Fair Cross Section Requirement of the Sixth Amendment 
Unlike equal protection, a fair cross section analysis does not require 
a showing of intent.225 Rather, the analysis centers on systematic exclusion. 
The Impartiality Clause of the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted by 
the Supreme Court to require that both federal and state juries be selected 
from a fair cross section of the community.226 Although this fundamental 
 
 225. Chernoff, supra note 1, at 161–62. 
 226. U.S. Const. amend. VI (providing in relevant part that a defendant has a right to an 
“impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”); see, e.g., 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as 
fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”).  
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right was not recognized under the Sixth Amendment until 1942,227 this 
legal concept is far from new. The related notion of a “jury of one’s 
peers” appeared in the Magna Carta in the early thirteenth century.228 In 
thirteenth century England, under the tradition of trial by jury de 
medietate linguae, mixed juries were provided to foreign defendants.229 
Mixed juries were composed of half of the defendant’s own countrymen, 
and since these individuals spoke defendant’s foreign language, the juries 
became known as jury de medietate linguae or a “jury of the half tongue.”230 
These mixed, multilingual juries existed in England for seven centuries and 
were also used in the American colonies, later becoming part of the 
common law tradition of seven states, a practice that spanned 237 years.231 
Thus, a linguistic and racial/ethnic jury of one’s peers is a long-
standing tradition in the United States. However, although modern 
common parlance and legal rhetoric often evoke this phrase (“jury of one’s 
peers”), in practice, defendants in criminal trials in the United States are 
not entitled to juries of their “peers.” Rather, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that the guarantee is not that a defendant will have a jury 
that looks like him in demographic particulars, but rather that the jury 
pool from which his petit or grand jury is selected will be drawn from a 
fair and representative cross section of the community.232 
In the beginning, unrepresentative juries were challenged under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These early 
cases focused on facially discriminatory statutes which explicitly excluded 
entire classes of persons, particularly African Americans, from jury 
service.233 As explicit racial statutory exclusions became outmoded, the 
courts were faced with claims that facially neutral jury selection laws and 
procedures resulted in the statistical underrepresentation of certain 
 
 227. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942). 
 228. Magna Carta § 39 (1215) (“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his 
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we 
proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals or 
by the law of the land.”). 
 229. Deborah A. Ramirez, A Brief Historical Overview of the Use of the Mixed Jury, 31 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 1213, 1214 (1994). 
 230. Id.  
 231. See Ramirez, supra note 6, at 790; Hiroshi Fukari & Darryl Davies, Affirmative Action in Jury 
Selection: Racially Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and Affirmative Juries of the Hennepin Model and 
the Jury De Medietate Linguae, 4 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 645, 654–55 (1997) (“At various times between 
1674 and 1911, a number of states—including Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New 
York, Virginia, and South Carolina—each provided for juries de medietate linguae.”). 
 232. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (“We have never invoked the fair-cross-
section principle to invalidate the use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective 
jurors, or to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the 
community at large.”).  
 233. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that West Virginia’s 
statutory exclusion of African American males from jury service on the basis of color and race violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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racial, gender, and economic groups. Initially, the courts continued to 
review these cases under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
For instance, in the 1935 case Norris v. Alabama, the Supreme 
Court held that a facially race neutral Alabama statute had been 
administered in such a way as to exclude African Americans from jury 
service in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.234 The Court found 
that the sweeping assertion by the jury commissioner that he did not 
know of any African American in the county that had the character, 
fitness, or other statutorily required attributes to serve on a jury was not 
sufficient to overcome the evidence that no African American had ever 
served on a jury in that jurisdiction despite the presence of qualified 
African Americans in the county.235 
Five years later, in Smith v. Texas, the Court reviewed yet another 
case involving exclusion of African Americans but this case differed 
because the exclusion was not absolute.236 Although African Americans 
constituted over twenty percent of the population of Harris County, 
Texas, and between three and six thousand such individuals were 
statutorily qualified to serve as jurors, only three African Americans had 
served as grand jurors in a seven year period.237 The Court found that 
“[c]hance and accident alone could hardly have brought about the listing 
for grand jury service so few negroes from among the thousands” 
qualified.238 Here, the state statutory scheme was not discriminatory on 
its face, but “by reason of the wide discretion permissible in the various 
steps of the plan,” it was capable of being applied in a discriminatory 
manner.239 The Court emphasized that: 
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments 
of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the 
community. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from 
jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our 
Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic 
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.240 
 
 234. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590–91 (1935) (“The jury commission shall place on the jury 
roll and in the jury box the names of all male citizens of the county who are generally reputed to be 
honest and intelligent men, and are esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and 
sound judgment, but no person must be selected who is under twenty-one or over sixty-five years of 
age, or, who is an habitual drunkard, or who, being afflicted with a permanent disease or physical 
weakness is unfit to discharge the duties of a juror or who cannot read English, or who has ever been 
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. If a person cannot read English and has all the 
other qualifications prescribed herein and is a freeholder or householder, his name may be placed on 
the jury roll and in the jury box.” (citing Ala. Code § 8603 (1923)). 
 235. Id. at 599. 
 236. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). 
 237. Id. at 129. 
 238. Id. at 131. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 130 (emphasis added). 
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Although decided under the Fourteenth Amendment, the concept of 
the jury needing to be a “body truly representative” is a direct precursor to 
modern day Sixth Amendment fair cross section jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, rather than focusing on racial animus or discriminatory 
intent, the Court looked to statistical evidence to determine that African 
Americans had been systemically excluded from jury service.241 
Two years later, in the 1942 case Glasser v. United States, the Court 
reiterated its formulation of representative juries, but this time within the 
framework of the Sixth Amendment’s Impartiality Clause.242 In 
addressing a claim of exclusion of all women who were not members of 
the Illinois League of Women Voters from the jury pool, the Court 
stated that officials charged with selecting jurors “must not allow the 
desire for competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not 
comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the 
community.”243 Thus, systemic jury pool exclusion cases (as opposed to 
individual juror exclusion) came under the purview of the Sixth 
Amendment and the fair cross section requirement was born. In 1975, 
the Supreme Court declared that the fair cross section requirement is a 
fundamental right.244 This fundamental right can be raised by criminal 
defendants irrespective of whether they are a member of the group 
allegedly excluded.245 
In the 1979 case Duren v. Missouri, the Court articulated the 
contemporary test to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross 
section requirement.246 This case confronted a Missouri statute that 
allowed women to request an automatic exemption from jury service.247 
Ultimately, the Court found that the statute resulted in an under-
representation of women in violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair 
cross section guarantee.248 In making this determination the Court put 
forth the test for establishing a prima facie violation: 
[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is 
a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of 
this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and 
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; 
 
 241. Id. at 129. 
 242. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (stating that “the proper functioning of the 
jury system, and, indeed, our democracy itself, requires that the jury be a ‘body truly representative of 
the community.’”). 
 243. Id. (emphasis added). 
 244. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
 245. Id. at 526 (holding that a male defendant has standing to challenge the exclusion of women 
from the jury pool); see Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (plurality) (finding that a white male could 
challenge the exclusion of African Americans from jury service). 
 246. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
 247. Id. at 360. 
 248. Id. 
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and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to the systematic exclusion 
of the group in the jury-selection process.249 
However, even if a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of a fair cross 
section violation, the government can overcome this demonstration if 
“those aspects of the jury-selection process,” which result “in the 
disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group,” advance a significant 
state interest.250 
Each prong of the Duren test, when applied to the juror language 
requirements (particularly with respect to the Latino community), 
exposes several problems as to the legitimacy of language exclusions. 
The first inquiry, whether the excluded group is “distinct,” raises the 
issue of how narrowly to define the group. The group could be 
articulated as LEP persons, a specific LEP racial group, or the racial 
group generally. For the purposes of this analysis, this Article defines the 
cognizable group as Latinos. Once the group is defined, the analysis 
turns to whether the representation of this group in the jury pool is “fair 
and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the 
community.”251 Finally, under the third prong of Duren, the test asks if 
this underrepresentation is due to the systematic exclusion of the English 
language requirement itself or to other factors.252 
In asserting a fair cross section claim, a Plaintiff must show that “the 
group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community.”253 
The Supreme Court has not defined the requirements for establishing a 
“distinctive” group.254 Nevertheless, in Lockhart v. McCree, the Court 
provided some limited guidance for groups that fall within the purview of 
a fair cross section claim.255 The Court reflected on the groups that have 
traditionally been recognized under fair cross section doctrine—namely 
African Americans, women, and Mexican Americans256—and noted that 
the recognized common factor between these groups has been the 
immutable nature of a group’s characteristics.257 The Court reasoned that 
the exclusion of jurors based on some immutable characteristic, such as 
racial, ethnic, or gender background, is not acceptable because it gives 
rise to an impermissible “appearance of unfairness.”258 In Lockhart, the 
 
 249. Id. at 364. 
 250. Id. at 367–68. 
 251. Id. at 364. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (“We have never attempted to precisely define 
the term ‘distinctive group,’ and we do not undertake to do so today.”). 
 255. See id. 
 256. Id. at 175. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
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Court also expressed concern about exclusions denying members of 
historically disadvantaged groups the right to serve on a jury.259 
Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court has provided little guidance in 
defining a “distinctive” group, federal and state lower courts have 
developed their own tests. Many courts have developed some iteration of 
the following test: 
(1) [T]he group must be defined and limited by some clearly 
identifiable factor (such as race or sex), (2) there must be a common 
thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas or experience which runs 
through members of the group, and (3) there must be a community of 
interest among the members of the group to the extent that the group’s 
interest cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded 
from the jury selection process.260 
Latinos “are unquestionably [a] ‘distinctive’ group[] for the 
purposes of a fair-cross-section analysis.”261 In Lockhart v. McCree, the 
Court stressed that “it [is] obvious that the concept of ‘distinctiveness’ 
must be linked to the purposes of the fair-cross-section requirement.”262 
These purposes include: “guard[ing] against the exercise of arbitrary 
power;”263 “ensuring that the ‘commonsense judgment of the community’ 
will act as ‘a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor;’”264 
“preserving ‘public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice 
system;’”265 and “implementing our belief that ‘sharing in the 
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.’”266 These first 
two fair cross section purposes are closely connected. Many communities 
that have a high Latino population are also high-crime areas. Latinos and 
Spanish speakers are overrepresented as criminal defendants, witnesses, 
and crime victims.267 Many crimes for which Latino defendants have been 
charged occur in Latino neighborhoods.268 When juror language 
restrictions are imposed in communities with a significant population of 
Latinos, the jury pool will likely not be representative of the community. 
This will deprive the jury of “jurors who share the same culture and 
language with witnesses and may have a better understanding of 
 
 259. Id. 
 260. See Vermont v. Pelican, 580 A.2d 942, 947 (Vt. 1990); see also Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 
681–82 (6th Cir. 1988); Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 
1216 (11th Cir. 1983); Washington v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210, 218 (Wash. 1987). 
 261. See United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Jackman, 
46 F.3d 1240, 1246 (2d Cir. 1995)); United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 941 (9th Cir. 2005); see 
also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478–80 (1954). 
 262. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986). 
 263. Id. at 174 (alteration in original). 
 264. Id.  
 265. Id. at 174–75. 
 266. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)). 
 267. See Fukurai, supra note 60, at 11. 
 268. Ronald Weich & Carlos Angulo, Citizens’ Comm’n on Civil Rights, Racial Disparities in 
the American Criminal Justice System 205 (2000). 
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testimony” and evidence.269 Including LEP Latinos in juries would likely 
decrease miscommunication, as well as actual and perceived racial and 
cultural bias. 
When a jury is racially or culturally homogenous, it is more difficult 
or less likely that the jurors will consider a wide range of perspectives 
during the fact-finding process.270 It is essential that during the fact-
finding process (whether during trial or deliberations), jurors understand 
all of the circumstances surrounding a particular event.271 After all, the 
justice system entrusts jurors with the important duty of finding “truth” 
in a particular case, and “truth” is not found by assessments based on 
homogenous points of view.272 Therefore, in the context of a trial with a 
Latino defendant and an LEP Spanish-speaking juror, that juror could 
provide significant insights to other members of the jury. For example, 
the juror might be able to explain certain Spanish slang words or 
colloquialisms not easily translatable into English; the juror might also be 
able to expound upon cultural practices or norms unique to the local 
Latino culture. 
The New Mexico jury system, which dates back to the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo, provides interpreters for LEP jurors.273 It is especially 
appropriate to have such a system in New Mexico given that 35.84% of the 
population of New Mexico speaks a language other than English at 
home.274 While the system poses some logistical problems for the courts—
mostly in finding enough interpreters—the inclusion of LEP jurors has 
been lauded as providing the fairest jury of defendant’s peers.275 In a state 
where more than one-third of the population is non-English speaking, 
the inclusion of non-English speaking jurors undoubtedly expands the 
cultural perspective and understandings of the jury pool, making trials 
more fair for defendants. The expansion of racial minority roles in the 
jury is particularly important because minority groups are typically 
 
 269. Fukurai, supra note 60, at 34. 
 270. See id. at 12. 
 271. See id. at 13. 
 272. In fact, Douglas Smith notes that the “evolution of modern American jury practices has had 
an adverse impact on the jury’s ability to discover the truth and to arrive at just outcomes.” Douglas 
G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for 
Reform, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 441, 451 (1997). 
 273. Scott Sandlin, Courts Rise to Language Challenge, Albuquerque J., Nov. 15, 2004, at A1. 
 274. U.S. Census Bureau, Detailed Tables, supra note 74, at tbl.34. In particular, in New 
Mexico, 28.31% of the population speaks Spanish. Id. 
 275. Associated Press, In New Mexico County, Jurors Need Not Speak English, Wash. Post, 
Dec. 16, 1999, at G09 (“Similarly, Larry Dodge, founder of the Fully Informed Jury Association, a 
nonprofit group in Helmville, Mont., that educates Americans about their rights as jurors, said he is 
not aware of any other state with such a provision. He welcomed the ruling. ‘If you’re talking about a 
jury of your peers, this is it,’ Dodge said. ‘We think a random cross-section of the community is the 
right way to run a jury trial.’”). 
Gonzales Rose_22 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete) 3/12/2014 4:19 PM 
April 2014]     LANGUAGE DISENFRANCHISEMENT 855 
overrepresented as criminal defendants.276 Furthermore, the juror 
interpreter system has become so widespread that a court interpreter 
noted “we’ve had trials where we’ve had eight non-English speakers (in 
the pool) and out of that, four were impaneled as jurors”—an indication 
that New Mexico trials include and embody the true idea of a “fair cross 
section” of the community.277 
While it is clear that Latinos present a “distinctive group” for prong 
one of the Duren analysis (and it is also possible that LEP Latinos might 
also constitute a “distinctive group”), the more complicated issue is 
whether the representation of this group in the jury pool is “fair and 
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the 
community.”278 To answer prong two of the Duren test, courts must 
establish which individuals should count within the community. For 
instance, should Latinos who are ineligible for jury service on the basis of 
citizenship status or former felon status be included in determining how 
many Latinos exist in the community? Or should the community only 
consist of those people who are statutorily eligible for jury service? 
Further, once the number of Latinos in the community and the number 
of Latinos in the jury pool are established, what level of systematic 
exclusion is sufficient to give rise to a constitutional violation?279 The 
federal circuits have split on the proper formula for determining an 
impermissible level of underrepresentation.280 
 
 276. Am. Soc. Ass’n, Dep’t of Research & Dev., Race, Ethnicity, and the Criminal Justice 
System 2–3 (2007). 
 277. Sandlin, supra note 273. 
 278. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
 279. See Stephen E. Reil, Comment, Who Gets Counted? Jury List Representativeness for 
Hispanics in Areas with Growing Hispanic Populations Under Duren v. Missouri, 2007 BYU L. Rev. 
201 (2007); Richard M. Ré, Comment, Jury Poker: A Statistical Analysis of the Fair Cross-Section 
Requirement, 8 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 533 (2011); Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational 
Exemptions: The Impairment of the “Fair Cross-section of the Community”, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 155, 
194–95 (1995). 
 280. This is evident from a comparison of the federal circuits and states which have the largest 
populations of Latinos. The First Circuit uses the absolute disparity test and jury eligible populations 
where available, but they do not expressly state a preference. The available cases reject fairly low 
absolute disparities (under five percent). See, e.g., United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999). 
The Second Circuit expresses a preference for jury eligible population figures, but recognizes that such 
figures are not generally readily available. Instead they use voting age population figures and an 
absolute numbers test to calculate disparities. This involves finding the absolute disparity and then 
calculating how many people from an underrepresented group would have to be added to the jury 
venire to remedy the underrepresentation. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 
1990). The Fifth Circuit uses absolute disparity. The circuit has rejected the use of total population 
figures as irrelevant. See United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315 (5th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit favors 
absolute disparity and will use total population figures where age eligible or jury eligible figures are 
not available. See United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2005). The Tenth Circuit 
uses both absolute and comparative disparity in determining whether underrepresentation exists. See 
United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399 (10th Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit prefers age eligible 
population figures when available. See United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998). The 
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Finally, the third factor in a Duren analysis is whether the 
“underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the 
jury-selection process.”281 The fact that exclusion of LEP jurors is a 
statutory and sometimes state constitutional mandate makes the third 
prong of the Duren test fairly easy to prove for the LEP juror group. 
Unlike many cases where underrepresentation of certain groups is the 
result of some “coincidence” in selection of the jury venire, in the case of 
juror language requirements the exclusion is the result of explicit 
governmental action. Here, therefore, underrepresentation of Latinos is 
due directly to statutory English language requirements and failure to 
provide juror language accommodation. The rationale for the exclusion 
of LEP jurors is that limited English ability, without the assistance of an 
interpreter, could pose a serious problem in a courtroom setting. 
Nevertheless, as the New Mexico example amply demonstrates, this 
seeming difficulty can be remedied. 
In Duren, the Court stated that the government could prevail despite 
demonstration of a fair cross section violation if the aspects of the jury-
selection process that resulted in the disproportionate exclusion advanced 
a significant state interest.282 The majority of fair cross section challenges to 
the English language juror requirements have come out of Puerto Rico, 
where ninety percent of the age-eligible population is excluded from jury 
service under the JSSA prerequisite.283 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit (which hears appeals from the U.S. District Court for Puerto 
Rico) has repeatedly held that, even assuming a fair cross section prima 
facie case had been made, such a claim would be overcome by the 
government’s interest that federal court proceedings be conducted in 
English.284 The First Circuit also upheld the government justifications for 
excluding LEP citizens from the jury pool, irrespective of the possibility 
of juror interpreters.285 The government might have a legitimate interest 
in conducting court proceedings in the English language; however, 
 
Eleventh Circuit uses absolute disparity but notes that it might not be as useful where the minority 
population in controversy is small and uses jury eligible population figures. See United States v. Pepe, 
747 F.2d 632 (11th Cir. 1984). Arizona favors an absolute disparity test. See, e.g., State v. Gretzler, 
612 P.2d 1023 (Ariz. 1980); Arizona v. Sanderson, 898 P.2d 483 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). California uses 
both the absolute and comparative disparity tests and prefers juror-qualified population data. People 
v. Currie, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Nevada uses both total population and age 
eligible population figures and absolute and comparative disparity figures. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 
926 P.2d 265 (Nev. 1996); Williams v. State, 125 P.3d 627 (Nev. 2005). New York uses both absolute 
and comparative disparities and allows the use of general population figures. See, e.g., People v. 
Guzman, 454 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). Texas uses total population figures and absolute 
disparity test. See, e.g., Stanley v. State, 678 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 
 281. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. 
 282. Id. at 367–68. 
 283. Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 498. 
 284. United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 19–20 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 285. United States v. Dubón-Otero, 292 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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allowing jurors to serve with the assistance of interpreters does not 
frustrate this interest. Permitting juror language accommodation actually 
strengthens the government’s interests in providing fair and impartial 
juries, as emphasized in the New Mexico jury service model. 
Since the right to a jury represented by a fair cross section of a 
defendant’s peers is a “fundamental right,”286 jurisdictions should be 
particularly sensitive to protecting the right, even in the face of state 
interests. Unlike felon prohibitions on jury service, where a state 
excludes potential jurors with perceived low moral values or who show 
disrespect for the law, or juror age requirements, which ensure a certain 
comprehension level and an understanding of the gravity of jury service, 
the particular problem that states seek to solve through juror language 
exclusions is remediable. It would be more difficult for a state to evaluate 
a felon juror’s respect for the justice system, or a twelve-year-old child’s 
understanding of legal proceedings; however, as New Mexico has 
demonstrated, it is quite possible to provide interpreters to LEP jurors. 
Thus, in the interest of protecting a defendant’s fundamental right to a 
fair trial and impartial jury, courts should reconsider the legitimacy of 
juror exclusions based on language ability and the state’s interest in an 
English-speaking jury panel. 
IV.  Juror Language Accommodation 
Modern courts and legislatures widely perceive English language 
deficiency as a valid reason to exclude potential jurors, under the 
assumption that a juror cannot serve effectively if she cannot understand 
the trial. But this language deficiency could be remedied by the use of 
interpreters. Although opponents of juror language accommodation 
might claim that allowing an interpreter to assist a LEP juror goes 
against our legal tradition,287 juror interpretation has a rich history in the 
development of the common law.288 The practice of mixed linguistic juries 
spanned seven centuries in England and has existed on what is now U.S. 
soil for more than two centuries.289 After the United States obtained one-
third of its current land mass from Mexico through the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 and the Sale of La Mesilla in 1853, 
monolingual Spanish speakers often served on juries with the assistance 
of interpreters until the early 20th century.290 
 
 286. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942). 
 287. See, e.g., Benmuhar, 658 F.2d at 20; Dubón-Otero, 292 F.3d at 17. 
 288. Ramirez, supra note 229, at 1214; Ramirez, supra note 6, at 790. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Laura E. Gómez, Race, Colonialism, and Criminal Law: Mexicans and the American Criminal 
Justice System in Territorial New Mexico, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 1129, 1166, 1172–73 (2000); Douglas A. 
Kibbee, Minority Language Rights: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, 3 Intercultural Hum. 
Rts. L. Rev. 79, 90 (2008); Colin A. Kisor, Using Interpreters to Assist Jurors: A Plea for Consistency, 
Gonzales Rose_22 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete) 3/12/2014 4:19 PM 
858 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:811 
Ever since New Mexico became a United States territory, it “has 
encouraged participation of non-English speakers, particularly Spanish-
speaking citizens, in its jury system.”291 Initially, this practice emerged out 
of necessity, since New Mexico was a predominately Spanish-speaking 
area and an adequate supply of English-speaking jurors was not readily 
available.292 But this practice was not only practical, but also motivated 
by a sense of respect: the practice gave the Spanish-speaking citizens of 
New Mexico an important societal duty and, in return, Spanish-speaking 
citizens valued the opportunity to ensure their equal participation in civic 
society.293 The common law practice of allowing non-English speakers to 
serve on juries was made a constitutional right in 1911.294 Article VII of 
the Constitution of New Mexico states that the “right of any citizen of 
the state to vote, hold office or sit upon juries, shall never be restricted, 
abridged or impaired on account of religion, race, language or color, or 
inability to speak, read or write the English or Spanish languages.”295 
New Mexico state courts have successfully allowed non-English speakers 
to serve on juries since the 1860s.296 
The New Mexico state courts use certified court interpreters, some 
on permanent staff and others who work on a contract basis.297 All 
interpreters are governed by detailed “Non-English-Speaking Juror 
Guidelines.”298 All litigants and jurors are informed of the interpreters’ 
role in the trial and deliberation proceedings.299 The interpreters take an 
oath in open court that they “will only provide translation services to the 
non-English-speaking juror and will not otherwise participate in the trial 
or jury deliberations.”300 During the LEP juror’s service, the interpreter 
provides simultaneous and consecutive interpretation of the proceedings, 
as well as written translation when necessary.301 
In addition to the language interpretation provided for LEP jurors in 
New Mexico, federal and state courts provide sign language interpretation 
for deaf jurors.302 Previously, deaf jurors were excluded from jury service 
 
22 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 37, 41–43 (2001); see, e.g., Town of Trinidad v. Simpson, 5 Colo. 65, 68 
(1879) (holding it was “fully within the power of the court to appoint an interpreter . . . to interpret the 
testimony of witnesses and the arguments of counsel” for a non-English-speaking juror). 
 291. Edward L. Chávez, New Mexico’s Success with Non-English Speaking Jurors, 1 J. Ct. 
Innovation 303, 303 (2008). 
 292. Id. at 305. 
 293. See id. at 303–04; Territory of New Mexico v. Romine, 2 N.M. 114, 123 (1881). 
 294. Chávez, supra note 291, at 303. 
 295. N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3. 
 296. Gómez, supra note 290, at 1172–73. 
 297. Chávez, supra note 291, at 309. 
 298. Id. at 317 (providing a copy of the Guidelines in Appendix A). 
 299. Id. at 318. 
 300. Id. at 308. 
 301. Id. at 309. 
 302. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). 
Gonzales Rose_22 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete) 3/12/2014 4:19 PM 
April 2014]     LANGUAGE DISENFRANCHISEMENT 859 
on the grounds that they lacked the English language and communication 
skills necessary to serve.303 However the Rehabilitation Act of 1973304 and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990305 have been employed to 
facilitate deaf persons’ full participation on juries with the assistance of 
sign language interpreters throughout the nation’s courts.306 Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against 
persons with hearing loss in “any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”307 Similarly, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
extended the prohibition of discrimination against deaf individuals to all 
governmental activities and made these services, programs and activities 
available to all qualified individuals with disabilities.308 The requirement 
that courts must provide interpreters for deaf jurors supports the 
argument that LEP jurors similarly should be allowed to serve on jury 
panels with the assistance of an interpreter. Scholars have argued that 
the analogy between deaf and LEP jurors is not about accommodation of 
disability, but rather that the two groups lack English language abilities 
and can be made competent to serve as jurors with reasonable 
accommodation in the form of interpretation.309 
There are four primary concerns about jurors serving with the 
assistance of interpreters: (1) jurors not relying on the official English 
record, (2) risk of inaccuracy in translation, (3) presence of a thirteenth 
person in the jury room, and (4) cost.310 Examination of these concerns is 
not only warranted, but also provides insights into the history, 
consequences, and perpetuation of systemic subordination of linguistic 
minorities. The first two concerns, accuracy and reliance on the English 
record, overlap. The trepidation that a juror will not rely on the English 
record that will ultimately be transmitted to the appellate court on 
appeal was the central issue in Hernandez,311 in which the Supreme Court 
held that a prosecutor may reject Latino English-Spanish bilingual jurors 
in cases with Spanish language testimony on the ground that the jurors 
might be guided by the original Spanish rather than the official English 
translation.312 Before getting to the doctrinal application of the holding in 
this case to juror language accommodation, it is appropriate to reflect on 
the broader implication of this opinion on the denial of Latinos’ 
 
 303. Jo Anne Simon, The Use of Interpreters for the Deaf and the Legal Community’s Obligation to 
Comply with the A.D.A., 8 J.L. & Health 155, 157–58 (1994). 
 304. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). 
 305. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
 306. Kibbee, supra note 290, at 91 n.35; Kisor, supra note 290, at 39. 
 307. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
 308. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
 309. See Kisor, supra note 290, at 38. 
 310. Gonzales Rose, supra note 209, at 532. 
 311. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371–72 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
 312. See id. 
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citizenship right of jury service. This was not a case in which the potential 
jurors indicated that they would not follow English language translation 
of Spanish evidence. The prosecutor acknowledged that the jurors 
indicated a willingness to follow the interpreter, and that he believed “in 
their heart they will try to follow” the interpreter, but stated that he 
doubted their ability to do so due to their bilingual abilities.313  
The legal justification of the severance of language from race, 
ethnicity, and national origin is that LEP citizens can become full citizens 
and serve on juries if they simply learn English—that language is a 
mutable characteristic.314 Leaving aside the issue of the considerable 
difficulties of learning a foreign language sufficiently to serve on a jury, 
Hernandez reveals that this is a false promise. Even once a citizen 
becomes highly proficient or fluent in English, she can still be excluded 
on the basis of her language ability. Although there have been instances 
where racial minorities have been subjected to abuse and trauma that has 
largely annihilated their language skills, such as Native American 
boarding schools,315 generally a person cannot voluntarily unlearn their 
mother tongue. One’s native language is an immutable characteristic that 
is usually central to identity of self, race, ethnicity, and national origin. 
Hernandez demonstrates the need to increase legal protection for 
language minorities. 
Although Hernandez dealt with bilingual rather than LEP jurors, the 
plurality opinion has implications for juror language accommodation. 
Peremptory challenges themselves have long been criticized as an obstacle 
to ensuring juries that fairly represent the community. As Justice 
Thurgood Marshall warned in his concurring opinion in Batson v. 
Kentucky, the “decision today will not end the racial discrimination that 
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal can be 
accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.”316 The 
scholarship critiquing peremptory challenges is plentiful.317 
For the purposes of juror language requirements, in a case where 
Spanish language evidence is introduced, a party (most likely a 
prosecutor) might rely on Hernandez to strike a Spanish-speaking LEP 
 
 313. Id. at 356. 
 314. See Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit Theory 
and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1585, 1613 (1997). 
 315. See generally David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians and 
the Boarding School Experience, 1875–1928 (1995). 
 316. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986). 
 317. See, e.g., Brian W. Stoltz, Note, Rethinking the Peremptory Challenge: Letting Lawyers 
Enforce the Principles of Batson, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1031 (2007); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A 
Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
1099 (1994); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s 
Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 809 (1997); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge 
Should Be Abolished, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 369 (1992). 
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Latino juror on the ground that he will not follow the English language 
evidence. The risk identified in Hernandez—that a juror would listen to 
the original Spanish testimony or evidence over its English translation—is 
significantly heightened where a juror has limited English proficiency. If 
the juror does not understand English well to begin with, it is likely that 
the juror would listen most closely to the original Spanish speaker (or 
other foreign language speaker). Furthermore, assuming that the juror 
does not understand English at all, she might have to rely solely on the 
original non-English testimony. 
Nevertheless, the prosecutor’s purported concern in Hernandez is in 
reality not significant. Jurors do not make decisions as individuals; they 
make them collectively. Therefore, if there were misinterpretation or 
misunderstanding of a key issue, deliberation discussions could reveal 
and remedy that. Furthermore, as discussed previously, the presence of 
jurors from varied backgrounds and language abilities might actually 
result in a more dynamic jury deliberation, particularly where one of the 
parties to the trial is also LEP.318 
The concern here is essentially one of accuracy. What is interesting 
is that Spanish language testimony and other evidence are increasingly 
introduced at trial.319 This evidence is interpreted or translated into 
English. There is little concern about the accuracy of these translations. 
If Spanish can be translated into English and is reliable enough to form the 
basis of someone’s criminal conviction and subsequent imprisonment, 
translating English into Spanish should not be an insurmountable obstacle 
for the courts. Furthermore, it is likely that many LEP Spanish-speaking 
jurors will have some degree of bilingualism and will be able to ensure 
that translation in both directions is more accurate. Thus, LEP jurors 
might actually provide a useful safeguard during multilingual trials as a 
result of their language ability. For example, during deliberation, LEP 
jurors could verify the testimony and clarify Spanish idioms or 
colloquialisms not easily or reliably translatable into English. 
Nevertheless, the concern about accuracy is valid. Court 
interpretation has challenges.320 However, the success in New Mexico 
shows that providing interpreters for jurors (even in a wide range of 
languages) is an attainable measure.321 Certainly, courts cannot move 
forward without trained interpreters and developed guidelines. But, courts 
 
 318. Fukurai, supra note 60, at 11. 
 319. See Lopez & Livingston, supra note 122, at 6 (“56% of Latinos say they or someone in their 
immediate family had interacted with the criminal justice system in at least one of the following ways 
in the five years preceding this survey”—serving as a witness, reporting a crime to the police, charged 
as a defendant, etc.); Deborah M. Weissman, Between Principles and Practice: The Need for Certified 
Court Interpreters in North Carolina, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1899, 1958 (2000). 
 320. Susan Berk-Seligson, The Bilingual Courtroom: Court Interpreters in the Judicial 
Process 234 (William M. O’Barr & John. M. Conley eds., 1990). 
 321. Chávez, supra note 291, at 303. 
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do not have to reinvent the wheel to establish a juror interpretation 
system: New Mexico stands as a useful model for other jurisdictions. 
Identifying and employing qualified interpreters is not without cost. 
In these challenging economic times a juror interpretation system is a 
significant investment of already scant resources. However, as the LEP 
population in the United States continues to grow, the Department of 
Justice has urged courts to increase language access for LEP 
populations.322 Civil litigants and criminal defendants are already entitled 
to interpretation services in the courts pursuant to the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause, due process, and Title VI. Further, the Sixth 
Amendment fair cross section requirement is implicated in communities 
that have a significant language minority. 
However, the pool of qualified and certified court interpreters, even 
for a common language such as Spanish, is surprisingly small, adding to 
the cost. This is a complex problem that has been caused by the 
subordination of language minorities, especially Latinos. A large portion 
of the land that constitutes “Texas, California, Arizona, New Mexico, 
Nevada, and parts of Utah, Colorado, and Kansas” was previously part 
of Mexico.323 With the land came people, the majority of whom spoke 
Spanish.324 In addition to these Chicanos who never crossed the border 
(the border crossed them)325 and their families are Latino immigrants 
who constitute the largest racial group of immigrants in the United 
States.326 Rather than embracing the richness of Spanish language abilities 
and promoting bilingualism, society has systematically attempted to force 
assimilation and exterminate Spanish language ability. Truly bilingual 
education programs have been replaced with English immersion.327 These 
programs were not the result of pedagogical imperative, but rather 
political actions motivated by English-only advocates, by a movement 
tainted with racist and xenophobic leaning.328 
English immersion often stunts a student’s intellectual development 
because, instead of learning a variety of academic subject areas, they 
must focus only on English language acquisition and therefore fall 
behind in grade level.329 Simultaneously, Latino youth are stripped of the 
 
 322. Dep’t of Justice, Language Access Plan (2012). 
 323. Delgado, supra note 142, at 8. 
 324. Salinas, supra note 33, at 96. 
 325. John M. Lipski, Varieties of Spanish in the United States 2 (2008). 
 326. See Randall Monger & James Yankay, Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Dep’t 
Homeland Sec., Annual Flow Report: U.S. Legal Permanent Residents: 2011 at 1, 4, tbl.3 (2012). 
 327. Jennifer Bonilla Moreno, ¿Only English? How Bilingual Education Can Mitigate the Damage 
of English-Only, 20 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 197, 198 (2012). 
 328. Salinas, supra note 33, at 917–18. 
 329. Paul R. Smokowski & Martica Bacallao, Becoming Bicultural: Risk, Resilience, and 
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Gonzales Rose_22 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete) 3/12/2014 4:19 PM 
April 2014]     LANGUAGE DISENFRANCHISEMENT 863 
opportunity to become educated in Spanish.330 It is one thing to speak 
Spanish at home and another to learn academically in Spanish. Someone 
may consider herself fully bilingual but be unable to communicate 
effectively when faced with work or educational demands in that 
language. As a result of devaluing Spanish, forced language assimilation 
that includes a lack of bilingual education and punishment for speaking 
Spanish at school, we are left without sufficient numbers of bilingual 
professionals to satisfy domestic linguistic needs and to be internationally 
competitive. The claim that language discrimination cannot be remedied 
because of the lack of qualified interpreters and the related cost of 
obtaining such interpreters needs to be considered in the context that the 
limited supply is a result of institutionalized, state-supported efforts to 
decrease foreign, and especially Spanish, language ability. 
The final concern is the presence of a “thirteenth” person in the 
deliberation room. However, there is already substantial support for such 
practice in our state and federal courts where sign language interpreters 
are allowed to interpret for deaf jurors during deliberations. Additionally, 
the presence of interpreters during deliberation has not been found to be 
a problem in New Mexico. Research is currently being conducted by 
Lysette Chavez and Markus Kemmelmeier of the University of Nevada-
Reno Department of Social Psychology into New Mexico’s bilingual 
juries, specifically on the effect of non-English speaking (“NES”) jurors 
on jury deliberations and jury verdicts. These researchers have engaged 
in archival study of cases to determine whether NES jurors have an effect 
on verdicts in criminal cases, and have conducted community surveys and 
mock jury studies. Although data analysis is ongoing, this research so far 
reveals several findings that support juror language accommodation and 
indicates the fairness of these trials. 
In criminal cases, archival research and mock jury studies show that 
there is no difference in verdicts between juries that have a LEP juror 
serving with language accommodation and juries that have no LEP jurors. 
The researchers conclude that “NES jurors and interpreters do NOT 
compromise deliberation outcomes.”331 The Chavez and Kemmelmeier 
research further indicates that the inclusion of NES jurors is actually 
beneficial for the court system. “Participants in the sample who had prior 
jury experience and served on a trial with an NES juror were likely to 
view future jury service positively compared to participants who had 
prior jury service but had NOT served on a trial with an NES juror.”332 
Further, “Anglo participants in the sample who had prior jury experience 
with NES jurors were more supportive of the inclusion of NES jurors 
 
 330. Id. at 905–06. 
 331. E-mail from Lysette Chavez, Univ. of Nevada-Reno, to Author (May 27, 2012) (on file with 
Author). 
 332. Id. 
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than Anglo participants who had not served with NES Jurors.”333 
However, this “was not the case for Latino participants. Latinos who had 
served with NES jurors did not differ in their support for the inclusion of 
NES jurors.”334 Thus, the data show that juror language accommodation 
actually positively impacted the New Mexico court system, providing a 
greater sense of justice through more representative juries and 
opportunities for democratic participation to a wider population. 
Conclusion 
As Latinos have become the largest racial minority group in the 
United States, it is more important than ever to evaluate whether the law 
is prepared to redress the discrimination experienced by this population. 
Language discrimination has been and continues to be a central 
manifestation of racism against Latinos. English language juror 
requirements are just one example of the way language discrimination 
relegates many Latinos to second class citizenship status. These 
requirements are also an example of how the existing juridical paradigm 
overlooks the realities of how language discrimination acts as a proxy or 
racial marker for racial discrimination. The time has come to employ new 
methodology, like Critical Originalism, to expose the discriminatory 
intent behind language restrictions. 
Excluding otherwise eligible jurors from service on the basis of their 
English language abilities constitutes the exclusion of racial minorities, 
particularly Latinos, from juries. Chief Judge Edward L. Chávez of the 
New Mexico Supreme Court has observed the benefits of juror language 
accommodation and advises: “Not only should our non-English-speaking 
citizens enjoy the privileges of citizenship, they should share in the 
responsibilities.”335 “All adult citizens should participate [on juries], 
because above all, justice requires an unapologetic and undaunted 
courage to exercise one’s moral genius. All people, no matter their 
station in life or their ability to speak and understand the English 
language have that moral genius.”336 Allowing jurors to serve with the 
assistance of interpreters would help ensure that Latino criminal 
defendants are tried by a jury of their peers, that LEP citizens are 
brought into the civil polity, and that our justice system’s commitment to 
equal protection under the law and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of 
an impartial jury are upheld. 
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